Tag Archives: ivory coast

NATIONAL SECURITY IN COTE D’IVOIRE: 2 LAWS PASSED!

1 Reply

January 13th, 2016, President Ouattara of Cote D Ivoire, promulgated two major laws on National Security. On one hand the Law N°2016-09 related to the Programming of Internal Security Forces for the years 2016-2020 and on the other hand the Law N°2016-10, related to Military Programming for the years 2016-2020. Besides the legal dimension of these laws, we praise their existence for security systems in Ivory Coast. Indeed, these two laws were expected for several decades without being a priority for the successive governments until recently, in 2012. How is it possible that for many years, governments could not find any coherence between National Security functioning and its organization? Several reasons seem to have delayed the formulation of these laws, in particular the years of military crises which affected the country.

It is at the end of the political crisis of 2011, that security systems in Ivory Coast knew a period of significant reforms, materialized by the Security Sector Reform (SSR). This reform allowed between 2011 and 2015, to formulate the major texts of National Security among which, the Strategy for National Security and the SSR Strategy. Defence and Internal Security merged to make only one through National Security concept. The measures retained within the framework of the SSR program, were scheduled in their execution over several years by being classified as short, medium and long-term reforms. All the short-term reforms have been implemented, they included in particular the formulation of texts related to National Security.

Furthermore, what makes those two laws decisive, is the fact that they allow to rationalize the implementation of the National Security Policy. Indeed, these laws register the investments and the diverse expenses for security over 04 years in a coherence and an unprecedented programming. The real challenge thus becomes their effective implementation. From a point of view of National Security governance, these laws translate and imply a level of transparency, accountability and integrity on behalf of the security and defence institutions. Their promulgation makes them open to the public, for consultation and especially allows the National Assembly, to play completely its role of democratic scrutiny and control of those institutions.

Apparently, passing a law on a precise subject does not imply its effective consideration. It is for that reason, that it seems more than ever essential that both ministries (Defence and Security) in charge of the implementation of the promulgated laws, are equipped with follow-up and evaluation mechanisms. Moreover, the National Assembly through its specialized commissions will be responsible for monitoring the implementation of those two laws.

As a consequence, big challenges await the institutions concerned by these two laws, we focus on the following: 1/ the translation of both laws in specific implementation directives or sectorial Action plans at the operational level; 2/ the introduction of reframing, follow-up and evaluation mechanisms  for the effective implementation of both laws ; 3/ the adherence by all National Security actors to the execution of those two laws; 4/ the consideration of a set of measures to facilitate the cut in staff, the reorganization of the structures and the operational capacity building of security forces; 5/ the annual revision of the aforementioned laws by the National Assembly; 6/ the adaptability of the laws facing diffuse and evolving threats; 7/ a significant national effort to mobilize the resources necessary for the implementation of the two laws; 8/ the progressive empowerment of National Security forces through the creation of a national civilian-Defence Industry for the production of goods both for military and civilian use; 9/ the effective accountability of the security institutions through regular reports made available to the National Assembly as for the good execution of the measures contained in the laws and a publication of the annual results ; 10/ the preservation of a budgetary credibility!

By JF CURTIS

 

Security in Africa: perspectives for 2016!

3 Replies

The past year, had its “crop” of crises and victims on the African continent. The security balance sheet of year 2015 is thus mitigated enough. If we trust the 2015 Global Peace Index (GPI), published by Institute for Economics and Peace, insecurity globally stagnated from a point of view of its intensity. According to the GPI, we count among the most secure countries : Ghana, Botswana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania and Gabon. It should be noted, that Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, demonstrated the most remarkable national security level improvements. On the other hand, we notice among the “bad pupils” : South Sudan, CAR, Somalia, DRC, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Mali, South Africa and Burundi.

Several factors allow to estimate the level of safety on the continent. The threats are multiple and strike the African countries in diverse ways and with a relative intensity. Terrorism remains the major threat affecting countries as Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Mali. Politico-military crises (political instability) also affects countries such as Burundi, DRC, South Sudan and CAR. A high level of criminality also strikes Nigeria, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Libya. The small weapons illicit traffic affects all the regions of the continent, given the conflicts which occurred there and which continue (Libya, Mali, CAR, etc.). Maritime piracy, also continues to weaken exchanges in the African waters, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden (Somalia, etc.). Finally, the questions of the security sector governance, remain a concern, because the security systems of several African states, are failing and require in-depth reforms. We do not pretend, to cover all the issues which threaten those states, but this brief assessment allows us to realize the urgency, to take into account very quickly all these challenges by building a strong security sector governance and reinforcing the regional and international cooperation.

In 2015, we made a few recommendations based on a 2014 security assessment in Africa. Today, it seems  crucial to assess if those recommendations have been carried out and if so, how effective they have been?

1/ With regard to the issue of political violence and political crises generally, it should be noted, that several elections were positively conducted on the continent in 2015. Ivory Coast moreover surprised the international community by its political maturity. On the other hand, countries as Burkina Faso which finally held calmed elections at the end of the year, endured military coups, bringing disorder. The Year 2016 will be too, rich in presidential elections in particular in Gabon, DRC,  Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Benin. The conditions around some of these elections remain shady and conflicting. We thus recommend, in order to prevent pre-electoral, electoral and post-election tensions, the following : a) the signature of a charter of acceptance of democratic alternation by all political parties, to reiterate their respect for the democratic game; b) the signature of a charter of inviolability of the constitution by all political actors, to avoid any unconstitutional violence; c) the UN and AU support in the follow-up of the pre-electoral and electoral process by the installation of surveillance missions. These missions could include nationals of countries which had successful elections in 2015, such as Ivory Coast, Guinea and Burkina Faso; d) a strong mobilization of the civil society following the example of the ” Balai Citoyen” in Burkina Faso. Indeed, citizen mobilization so as to ensure transparent and democratic elections is more than necessary in Africa. Citizen watch has to express itself in the respect for the law and be taken into account by national leaders.

2/ Concerning the fight against terrorism, the continent mobilized militarily speaking. Indeed, several initiatives were taken or are in the course of execution, both at the coordination and operational levels, in particular the creation of a multinational mixed force ( 8700 men) by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the G5 Sahel which organizes the installation of a joint integrated general staff. In a pragmatic way, all the current initiatives are essentially military, in regard to regional cooperation or combat equipment assistance or intelligence support or still in terms of capacity building of the African armies by the western armies. The civil dimensions of this merciless fight against terror spread by the Islamic State, Boko Haram, el Shabbab or Aqmi, remains neglected. Thus we recommend for 2016 the following measures: a) a regional and national mobilization for the implementation of sensitization and awareness politics, towards populations to thwart the psychological warfare engaged by these terrorist groups; b) the actual setting up at the national level, of watch groups in all the communities, to alert the authorities in case of threats; c) the increase of the Human Development Index (HDI), in every African country to break the link “ignorance-poverty-terrorism”; d) a greater commitment of the Muslim communities, in the fight against terror, by creating watch committees in order to foster awareness and sensitization; e) the effective creation of elite units specialized in counter terrorism, would be a main advantage; f) the formulation and implementation of national policies aimed at preventing and repressing any religious radicalisation!

3/ Concerning the post-crisis tensions which affect few countries, such as Burkina Faso, we suggest the following : a) the pursuit of any Security Sector Reforms (SSR) national program, in countries such as Mali and Ivory Coast. The formulation and implementation of a SSR national policy in countries as Burkina Faso, enduring a paralysis of its security systems is necessary. The SSR must be regularly monitored, by an independent mechanism, to ensure its coherence and its efficiency; b) the institution of viable mechanisms of human development, allowing to fight against the impoverishment of the African societies and so to reduce their vulnerability; c) the acceptance of the rules of good governance is critical for these countries, which in a context of recovery also have to create a mechanism in charge of promoting on one hand, integrity, transparency, ethics and accountability and on the other hand, sanctioning any breach in these principles.

4/ Regarding training and capacity building, the creation of civilian think tanks dedicated to strategic thinking, is on the agenda more than ever. Indeed, reflection remains the heart of anticipation and prevention. Several centres or institutes already exist regarding security on the continent in particular, The Institute for Security Studies (ISS, South Africa), the Moroccan Centre of Strategic Studies (CMES, Morocco) or still the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC, Ghana) and the Institute for Strategic Studies and Defence (IESD, Ivory Coast). The interaction between these centres and states, is critical to enrich research on the highly strategic matters. However, it is crucial that these centres are not just the consequence of a trend. Indeed, the example of the IESD is edifying, because since the launch of its activities in June, 2015, no activity was organized. Worse, the IESD does not have a management team, no recruitment was made, it has no headquarters and no training program. It is almost an empty shell.

5/ Finally, with regard to borders control, the African states are more than ever vulnerable, because having excessively permeable borders. Indeed, this porosity favors the traffics of every type from drug trafficking, to human trafficking. It is time for the African countries to consider borders control as an absolute priority. Sound national borders control policies must be formulated and implemented. The cross-border cooperation owes, too to be reconsidered and improved in particular in the monitoring of migration flows! Moreover, a better control of the borders contributes widely to the fight against several plagues of which terrorism.

So as to conclude, we have in a few words, covered critical issues to be addressed in 2016. It is up to African states, to welcome the strategic reflection with open arms, in order to enrich the existing state capacities. Besides it is urgent that the resolutions stemming from various meetings on security held in 2014 and 2015 (Dakar Forum , Tana Forum, etc.), see a beginning of implementation. To finish, the task can seem extremely difficult, however to reflect Antonio Gramsci’s famous quote,  ” even if we are pessimists because of intelligence, we have to be optimists because of will “.

By JF CURTIS

Army professionalization: Case study of Cote d’Ivoire

Leave a reply

The question of the professionalization of the Ivory Coast army, is a subject which for several decades remains thorny. Indeed, after several politico-military crises , Ivory Coast reconstructs quite slowly on still fragile foundations. The commentators of the national context, tend to separate the advent of a professional army from the stabilization of the country. How to build a professional army, when the causes of the politico-military crises which shook the country, are partially taken into account in the resolution of those crises? The multiple breaches of the Ivory Coast soldiers tarnished their image, then contributed to the bad governance of the defence sector (Transparency International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2013, Ivory Coast ranked High risk). The massive insufficiently qualitative recruitments, operated during and after all these crises, the last one of which was the one of 2010, came to dissolve the achievements of the 70s and 80s which were relevant years for the Ivory Coast army until the military coup of 1999. The FANCI (Armed Forces of Ivory Coast), were a model up to the 90s because they embraced professionalism and republican values.

President Ouattara, in his diverse speeches intended for the armies, always emphasized the professionalism and the necessity to build an ” emerging army “. He constantly warned the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (FRCI since 2011, former FANCI), as for their behaviour which have to be the reflection of discipline, public-spiritedness and republican values.  He also reminded to the servicemen, their place in society as guarantor of freedom and territorial integrity. Furthermore, he reminded them that their duty is to serve the nation. Besides, from all the troubles which undermine the armies, corruption, abuses and political instrumentalization remain the most fought but still active concerns.

We cannot consider the professionalization of the armies without defining it. What thus a professional army? The professionalization of an army, is its profound qualitative transformation at the staff level. This transformation aims at improving the national defence sector, to make it an effective and reference tool. Professionalization comes along with a reconsideration of staff (reduction, rejuvenation, feminization, training, careers, academic route, etc.), to adapt itself to new missions and realities. In most of the cases, the professionalization of the armies is a consequence of an evolving and revised defence policy. The example of France in this domain is edifying in many respects, despite the multiple controversies which ensued from it. Professionalization thus emphasizes the capacity building of servicemen and women.  Training is at the heart of professionalization also called “career army”. To say things simply, by choosing the professionalization of an army, a State chooses quality through training and technicality.  Professionalization brings answers to endogenous needs (low levels of education and training), as well as exogenous ones (new threats like cyberwar, terrorism etc.) which require specific skills and new answers, adapted to reality and its new challenges.

In Ivory Coast, the professionalization of the armies has a implementation framework which is since 2011, the Security Sector Reform (SSR). Indeed, this vast qualitative transformation of all the actors of the security sector, towards a better governance, integrates specific reforms  for the armies, aiming at professionalization. The illustration of this current professionalization is the capacity building of the officers and the non-commissioned officers since a few years as well as the creation of specialized units (CCDO, Special forces, etc.) to tackle specific threats. Historically, the professionalization of the armies in Ivory Coast, knew four major periods:

1/ From 1970 till 1990: the period of construction and consolidation of the armies. For this period, the armies had their hour of glory and the question of the professionalization was of the exclusive competence of the Ministry of Defence.

2/ From 1990 till 2002: the period of upheavals (military coups) and unprecedented political instrumentalization. There also, the Ministry of Defence was the unique actor of a possible professionalization.

3/ From 2002 till 2010: the period of the major discussions on defence or the stammerings of the professionalization. For this period, the leading actor of professionalization became because of the political context, the Prime Minister’s Office, chairing the Workgroup on the Refoundation and the Restructuring of the Armies ( GTRRA). This workgroup gathered all the actors of national defence, to propose a new defence policy accompanied by a plan of professionalization and of reunification of the conflicting parties ( FANCI / FAFN).

4/ Since 2011: the Presidency of the Republic, through the National Council for Security, coordinates the professionalization of the armies, the base of which was in 2012, the Workgroup on the Security Sector Reform (GTRSS), think-tank on the aforementioned reform and its implementation. The FANCI merged with the FAFN, became FRCI in 2011.

This short historic reminder, highlights a major evolution, in the appropriation of professionalization at the national level. From the Ministry of Defence ( 1970-2002 ) through the Prime Minister’s Office ( 2002-2010 ) to find itself at the Presidency (2012-) nowadays. The professionalization of the armies was never decreed officially but it is implicitly quoted in all the reference texts, such as the political agreements since 2003, the national security policy as well as the national SSR strategy. There were thus several attempts to make rational ” the professional army ” in Ivory Coast, but we are not at a time of assessment because it is only since 2011 that this project was really conducted.

Once this brief inventory of the professionalization of the armies in Ivory Coast achieved, it seems more than necessary to remind some of the challenges that faces the implementation of a professional army:

1/ The consideration of sociopolitical prerequisites is a priority in the professionalization of the armies. So the issues connected to national reconciliation and post-crisis stabilization, must be resolved to guarantee a successful professionalization. Let us not forget that the cement of an army is its cohesion. As such, the army owes in particular, to be a model of tolerance and to reflect the nation in its diversity. The germs of the discord and conflict have to disappear.

2/ An exhaustive review of the professionalization of the armies is more than necessary. Indeed, in spite of the attempts of professionalization and the multiple realized audits, what about the achievements? Where are we with this professionalization? What are the weaknesses and strengths of the initiatives up to here? It is urgent to conduct an evaluation of the professionalization of the armies in Ivory Coast so as to update the existing data. For instance, the Ministry of Defence announced that the armies went from 15000 men in 2011 to 23000 today. How is this increase of staff part of an efficient professionalization plan? Is this increase as qualitative than it is quantitative?

3/ The formulation of a strategic program for the professionalization of the armies is imperative. On this point it is good to remind the urgency of an in-depth reflection regarding the professionalization of the armies on the horizon 2025. This strategic program will take into account studies already realized on the subject, will identify the key areas of this professionalization and will translate into an action plan, the retained actions for that purpose.

 

Thoughts on governance in the security and defence sector

Leave a reply

This short paper aims to share few thoughts on governance issues in the security and defence sector based on my personal assessment of cote d’Ivoire. Transparency International published an outstanding index in 2013 (GI2013) by assessing corruption risks in the defence sector. The topics (themes) that I cover below, all come from that Index. One can easily apply the guidelines to any country and adapt them to the national reality.

1/ Legislative scrutiny over defence and security policies:

There is a formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy in Cote d’Ivoire (article 71 of constitution). However, in practice, that provision is insufficient because the national Defence Policy formulation process itself is not mentioned in the constitution as being part of the National Assembly (NA) mandate for scrutiny.

Indeed, Article 71 of the constitution stipulates that only “Military Personnel status”, “the Police status” and “Defence organization” are all subjected to the national assembly inputs. This is largely unsatisfactory and limits the action of the National Assembly.

The budget issue is also mentioned in that article 71, so it is the responsibility of the NA to vote the national defence budget before it is implemented. There is to this date no evidence of such vote for the past 4 years.

At last, despite the fact that the legislative scrutiny is referred to in the constitution, the influence of the NA on the defence policy formulation has always been very limited if not ineffective.

So as a general recommendation, legislative scrutiny over defence and security policies in any country is necessary and clearly proves a good level of transparency.

2/ Public debate over the defence policy:

Unfortunately, in cote d’Ivoire, the national defence policy is not debated and publicly available. One major reason for that is the opacity surrounding this issue. Moreover, a national security strategy has been adopted by the National council for Security (CNS). Unless this security policy is adopted by the national assembly, it will not be publicly available.

Therefore, one must admit that efforts have been made to bring issues related to national defence to the public.

The security sector reform is bringing the authorities to formally formulate a national defence policy which is inclusive and holistic. For instance, the national SSR strategy is available publicly and has been debated openly (all SSR actors participated) before being adopted. On the other hand, a public consultation (survey) has not been done to this end.

At last, the national assembly has not yet examined and passed the Law related to  the National Security and defence  Policy. This is due to the fact that this policy has not been made available to the national assembly.

As a general rule for a country to prove a certain level of transparency and good governance, it is critical to involve the public in the formulation of any defence or security policy through a public consultation (survey).

3/ Anti corruption policy dedicated to the defence and security sector:

Cote d’Ivoire has an openly stated general anti-corruption policy. Indeed, “the national plan for good governance and against corruption” and “the order N° 202013-660 of September 20th of 2013 about prevention and fight against corruption” are the main anti-corruption instruments.  They also apply to the military forces and the police.

However there is no openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy towards the defence sector exclusively. “The military code “ does not specifically address corruption issues that might concern the soldier. In 2013, the Ministry of Defence initiated an Ethical Charter and a military code of conduct.  To this day there is no evidence of any of those two initiatives to be effectively adopted by the national assembly or any other institution. Nor are they publicly available. To this date the ministry of defence has arrested many soldiers involved in racketeering, extortion and fraud. Still efforts have to be made to implement the rules equally among soldiers involved in such crimes.

So in order to be effective, an anti-corruption policy must be clearly stated and strongly implemented.

4/ Whistleblowing as a solution to fight corruption:

Whistleblowing as a mean to fight corruption is more and more encouraged by the government. There is a law that protects whistleblowers from any type of threat (Order N°202013-660, chapter 3). This law applies to any citizen whether he belongs to the defence or the security ministries.

It is almost impossible to say whether this law offering protection is working in practice because security must prevail for any whitleblower. However, the chapter dedicated to this matter exists. The law has to be applied. Besides, the lack of trust among military personnel prevents any whistleblowing activity.

Whistleblowing as a mean to fight corruption in the security forces is a effective way provided there are clear guidelines and that allegations are not made on a subjective basis.

5/ Objective appointment and promotion within the security and defence forces:

The military personnel are unfortunately not subjected to an independent, transparent and objective appointment system in cote d’Ivoire. Nepotism and tribalism have for the past 3 years harmed the whole selection process for appointments in the military. Indeed, there is a committee in charge of appointments within the military but this committee lacks independence and transparency. Most of the time appointments will be made accordingly to political orders coming from above. Since the end of the crisis in 2011, tribal biased appointments have been denounced by international NGOs such as International Crisis Group and Amnesty International.

Regarding promotions, theoretically, military personnel are promoted through an objective and meritocratic process. Besides, within the defence and security institutions can be found specific committees in charge of assessing potential candidates for promotion, in conformity with the law and internal rules. However, political consideration and favoritism sometimes weaken the process. In many cases external institutions influence decisions made by those committees. So there is no independent oversight on this matter.

Appointment and promotion are key matters when it comes to governance in the defence and security sectors. So they both have to be tackled very seriously.Objectivity and merit must prevail in the decisions made. Moreover, mechanisms created to manage appointments and promotions must be independent.

6/ Defence purchases coherence with identified and quantified requirements:

In cote d’Ivoire, most of the defence purchases made do not derive from any coherent assessment mechanism. So there are no clearly identified and quantified requirements. For some specific security situations, needs are identified and purchases made. So it is more opportunistic than thoroughly planned. For instance the latest purchase of surveillance and war vessels in 2014, does not comply with the national security strategy or any other policy document. However these maritime acquisitions derive from the need to counter maritime piracy and to show neighbors the maritime capacity of cote d’ivoire in case of dispute or crisis.

Coherence and conformity must prevail when it comes to defence or security purchases because requirements exist within security and defence policies and acquisition laws and must be implemented as planned.

 

From crisis to emergence

Leave a reply

African countries all seek emergence a way or another. The path to emergence is long and tortuous. unfortunately “scourges” like corruption,  political crisis and military conflicts negatively affect that “hope for development”.

The case of Senegal is a good example of an African country seeking development and reaching its goal. Senegal is always cited as an example of good governance and good practices compared to many other countries. A Senegalese NGO created an indicator (mackymetre.com)  to measure the level of implementation of President’s Macky Sall presidential program. The Senegalese note their president’s program in terms of what has effectively been achieved since Macky Sall is in power. As of today, 100 key actions have not been executed, 23 are being implemented and 15 have been achieved. 9.6 per cent of the Senegalese are satisfied with the implementation level while 31.2 per cent are not! Those results just confirm the world bank latest “doing business” ranking regarding Senegal which ranks 178 out of 189 countries. On the other hand, Mo Ibrahim’s Foundation for Governance, ranks Senegal 10 out of 52 countries in 2013.

This Senegalese progress and governance indicator should become a reference in west Africa and be implemented as much as possible in order to foster governance good practices and democratic scrutiny.

Although Senegal still faces the Casamance crisis, the country is reaching development at a reasonable pace despite a difficult business environment!

Another country that deserves our attention is Cote d’Ivoire. The country came out of it’s political crisis in 2011 and is growing fast in specific fields and is slow in others!

Cote d’Ivoire is still in a post crisis environment because stabilisation is not achieved yet. Indeed, major fields like Governance, social reconstruction and economic recovery, Security Sector Reform (SSR), Justice and Reconciliation are unevenly taken into consideration.

President Ouattara announced emergence in 2020. This announcement was made without any public consultation to make sure people understood what “emergence” meant exactly?

In fact the best way to assess the level of implementation of the President’s presidential program is to monitor it’s key actions until today. A way to do so is to ask the people themselves. In order to reach emergence, we should have asked the people what their expectations were and their assessment of the President’s program implementation.

So Cote d’Ivoire is performing great regarding major investments but insufficiently regarding small and medium businesses involved in economic recovery. Justice is still unevenly applied, social reconstruction is more or less on it’s way, governance needs to be strengthened, SSR is hardly implemented because of a lack of national ownership and a lack of independent monitoring/assessment mechanism. At last, reconciliation is stalling because the major actors concerned are lacking political will and the origins of the crises that stroke the country are not tackled efficiently and entirely.

Indicators like Mo Ibrahim and Transparency International, rank Cote d’Ivoire among the worst countries despite the World Bank promising analyses (Doing business).

The stabilisation process will continue to stumble and stall unless problems that led to all the crises are solved a way or another. It is precisely the lack of involvement of the actors which slows down the whole recovery process that should if achieved lead Ivoirians to emergence in 2020.

Finally, in the case of Mali a political crisis melt with a terrorism issue. Mali is far from emergence therefore efforts are being made in that end. The major issue for now is pacification of the territory and solving the issue with MNLA. Recovering the territories is the priority and fighting Al Qaida is a prerequisite to peace and prosperity in the country and furthermore in the region.

The Malian government is tackling the stabilisation process with the help of international experts. One must bear in mind that a successful stabilisation process in the country is a prerequisite to its development. Reconciliation with the “Tuareg people” is also a prerequisite to stability in the country.

From those three specific examples taken in west Africa, one can easily assess the need for a sound, coherent and inclusive stabilisation and recovery program in a post conflict environment in order to reach emergence.