At the end of the SCID Course, students are asked to reflect upon the whole Course and write a position paper (of about 750 words). The paper should be on an issue related to building security and justice in post-conflict environments that they feel most passionate about which requires attention by, at least an element of, the international community. The postscript to the paper summarises reasons why effective action has not been taken to date. Students are asked to draw on their own experience and knowledge as well as academic material, with the aim of persuading the reader to agree with the position put forward and, if necessary, to act, while displaying academic writing and analytical skills.

Those papers that secured a Merit or Distinction (i.e. above 60%) are reproduced on this page.

SCID March 2014 Intake

The Forgotten Voices of War: Providing Access to Security and Justice for Male Victims of Sexual Violence – Rinret Dabeng

Today, sexual violence in times of conflict is considered one of the most traumatic and egregious human rights violations. The consequences of sexual violence are deep, that they have the power to destroy individuals and tear communities apart (Nguyen, 2014). While UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013) recognizes that men and boys can be victims of sexual violence, in practice, policy initiatives and programmatic approaches have been based on the misguided assumptions that victims of sexual violence are almost exclusively female. Even when male victims are acknowledged, it is done so in passing, resulting in the minimization of the problem (Carpenter, 2006). The recent recognition of male-directed sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings presents us with a unique opportunity to widen the debate on ways to address sexual violence against civilians in post-conflict settings and to recognize male survivors’ needs as a public health and international security issue worldwide (SVRI, 2011). While some of the content of this paper are explicit and disturbing, it has become necessary to dissect the open secrets of war.

Over the last two decades, sexual violence against men has been noted in several armed conflicts, including Burundi, Croatia, Liberia, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Data shows that between 1998-2008 alone, male-directed sexual violence was reported in over 25 conflict-affected countries. Since then reports of sexual violence against men has emerged from major conflicts in Libya, Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (Sivakumaran, 2007; Dolan, 2014). Sexual violence against men and boys- including rape, enforced rape (in which men are forced to rape or perform other sexual acts against other men), sexual and physical torture such as castration and other forms of genital violence, sexual humiliation such as enforced nudity and enforced masturbation often accompanied by sexual psychological torture and threats, forced incest and sexual slavery is a pervasive feature of armed conflicts worldwide. In some instances, sexual violence against men can be committed with the express intent of causing the victim’s death (Glassborow, 2008; Lewis, 2009) while in others, it is committed with the express intention of transmitting harmful sexual diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Sivakumaran, 2007).

While the scope and extent of sexual violence against men is unclear, a growing body of anecdotal evidence shows that male-directed sexual violence can occur in any form of conflict and in any cultural context (Russell, 2008). In Afghanistan, the culture of ‘bacha baazi’ (directly translated as “boy for play”) involves men who collectively exploit, enslave and/or rape boys. Young boys are forced to dress in female clothes for the entertainment of other men and are eventually sold to the highest bidder or shared sexually amongst wealthy or politically influential Afghan men including former warlords and government officials (Jones, 2015). In Sri Lanka, male victims of sexual violence have reported being raped anally, often with the use of foreign instruments or forced to perform fellatio or masturbate soldiers or other victims for entertainment (Sivakumaran, 2007). In former Yugoslavia, numerous reports found that victims were forced to bite each other’s testicles off. In addition, cases emerged in which men were held at gunpoint and forced to perform sexual assaults on others, including on family members, others were raped using objects like police truncheons or sticks (UNSCR, 1994). Deliberate genital violence and mutilation through beatings and electroshock in order to prevent reproduction were reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Northern Ireland (Sivakumaran, 2007). Reports of mass rape by multiple perpetrators have been reports in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Dolan, 2014; Gettleman, 2009).

Aside from being victimized, male victims of sexual violence are often unprotected by national laws. Up to 90% of male victims of conflict-related sexual violence are from countries that offer no protection for men. 63 countries acknowledge only female victims of rape and 70 states criminalize men who report being raped and in 28 countries, only males (Nguyen, 2014; Dolan, 2014). Indeed, “not only do these frameworks make justice for male victims an impossibility in many countries, they can actively deter first-instance reporting to police and service providers by male victims” (Dolan, 2014:5). Men suffer a myriad of physical consequences such as reproductive health issues, genital and rectal injuries and sexually transmitted diseases (Tewksbury, 2007). They may experience trauma, feelings of shame, confusion, guilt and isolation. They are likely to have suicidal thoughts and even attempt to commit suicide (SVRI, 2011). They often express hostility and in some instances can even become abusive towards their spouses or children in efforts to reaffirm their masculinity (Manivannan, 2013).

A general misconception exists that in conflict and post-conflict settings, women are more likely to be displaced or sexually assaulted, and that men are more susceptible to physical violence and forced recruitment. Such assumptions are both difficult to confirm without the compilation of data that includes the experiences of men and women in humanitarian emergencies. More research on scope of sexual violence, its perpetrators and its victims in order to build a reliable quantitative and qualitative evidence base is needed. Sensitization and public awareness campaigns can be used a method to encourage reporting, identification and punishment of sexual violence against men (Manivannan, 2013). In addition, revised training needs to be provided for all humanitarian, peacekeeping and developmental actors on gender-inclusive and gender-sensitive approaches to responding and preventing sexual violence. Men’s needs for culturally sensitive medical assistance, psychosocial support and reintegration initiatives needs must be addressed in humanitarian programming, including appropriate ways to identify and classify sexual violence against men (Carpenter, 2006). Post conflict-countries should contemplate conducting trials and truth commissions in cooperation with medical and psychosocial interventions. This facilitates reporting and recognition of sexual violence and grants the victim justice by ending impunity. Alongside women, men must be represented in post-conflict and international justice initiatives- and not just as perpetrators (Russell, 2007; Manivannan, 2013). The post-conflict period offers a space to rewrite legislation and review domestic systems so that victims can be afforded access to legal protection and reparations.

POST SCRIPT

Even though both male and female victims of sexual violence experience obstacles in achieving justice, arguably, male victims face even greater challenges than females. These challenges are part of the many reasons that the international community has failed to act affectively to address male sexual violence. Firstly, while no specific definition of gender-based violence has been adopted, definitions in international criminal law, most transitional justice mechanisms and international humanitarian law tend to perpetuate existing gender stereotypes that exclude men as victims and women as perpetrators. Common amongst NGOs, inter-governmental organizations and the victims themselves, these stereotypes only serve to stigmatize men even more and discourage them from reporting crimes committed against them. Under reporting influenced by shame, guilt and emasculation; fear of community rejection and ostracism; and male victims’ misunderstanding of what constitutes sexual assault is arguably one of the biggest challenges to addressing male sexual violence because it creates the illusion that sexual violence seldom experience sexual violence. In addition, medical and mental health professionals, court staff and other stakeholders are not particularly interested in addressing cases of sexual violence (Manivannan, 2013). Victims have reported that they often hold homophobic notions that male victims are gay (Dolan, 2014).

Linked to lack of reporting, under-recognition is another challenge to effective action. Medical and psychosocial professionals and humanitarian workers arwe not appropriately trained to search, identify and classify symptoms of sexual abuse in men. As a result, sexual violence against men is often mis-characterized as physical violence or torture (Sivakumaran, 2007) and profesionals often look for indicators common to women: penetrative rape (Manivannan, 2013). In certain instances, international organizations purposefully do not acknowledge male victims conflict-related sexual violence. The political nature of donor funding from governments or private companies prefer to focus on sexual violence against women. In fact, some NGOs have explicitly stated that their bias for female victims of sexual violence is influenced by their desire to secure and maintain funding (Manivannan, 2013).

Finally, in post-conflict settings, survivors of sexual violence face many challenges to accessing care and gaining justice, further complicated by socio-cultural dynamics such as stigmatization and institutional failures. In the face of weakened state institutions and breakdown in the rule of law, perpetrators of sexual violence are seldom punished by any justice mechanism, leading to a culture of impunity. Impunity is further worsened by lack of reporting and recognition of sexual violence- leading to a vicious cycle of violence and subliminally reinforcing the notion that sexual violence against men is less important (Manivannan, 2010).

REFERENCES

Carpenter, R. (2006) ‘Recognizing Gender-based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations’ Security Dialogue 37(1): 83-103. Available through: http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/1/83 (accessed on 23 October 2015).

Dolan, C. (2014) Into the Mainstream: Addressing Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys in Conflict, 14 May, http://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/briefing_papers/Into_The_Mainstream-Addressing_Sexual_Violence_against_Men_and_Boys_in_Conflict.pdf, (accessed on 25 October 2015).

Gettleman, J (2009) ‘Symbol of Unhealed Congo: Male Rape Victims’, The New York Times, 4 August, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/africa/05congo.html?_r=2 (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Glassborow, K. (2008) ‘Call for Lubanga Charges to Cover Rape’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 12 May, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=344590&apc_state=henh (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Jones, S. (2015) ‘Ending Bacha Bazi: Boy Sex Slavery and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine’ Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 25(1): 63-78. Available through: http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1595&context=facpubs (accessed through 26 October 2015).

Lewis, D. (2009) ‘Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence Against Men in Conflict Settings Under International Law’ Wisconsin International Law Journal 27(1): 1-49. Available through: https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9823975/Lewis_2009_UnrecognizedVictims.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Manivannan, A. (2013) ‘Seeking Justice for Male Victims of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict’ International Law and Politics 46: 635-679. Available through: http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/46.2-Manivannan.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Nguyen, K. (2014) ‘Powerful Myths Silence Male Victims of Rape in War’, Thompson Reuters Foundation, 15 May, http://www.trust.org/item/20140515154437-het27/ (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Russell, W. (2007) Conflict-related Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys, January 2007, http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Wynne_Russell/publication/260002638_Conflict-related_sexual_violence_against_men_and_boys/links/0a85e52f027dc4de22000000.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Sivakumaran, S. (2007) ‘Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’ European Journal of International Law 18(2): 253-276. Available through: http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/2/253.full.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2015)

SVRI (2011) Care and Support of Male Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, South Africa: South African Medical Research Council. Available through: http://www.svri.org/CareSupportofMaleSurviv.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2015).

Tewksbury, R. (2007) ‘Effects of Sexual Assaults on Men: Physical, Mental and Sexual Consequences’ International Journal of Men’s Health 46(1): 22-35. Available through: http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/effectsofsexualassaultsonmen-physicalmentalandsexualconsequences.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2015).

United Nations Security Council (1994) Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2015).

Aiding Security or Securing Aid? – Ian Getty

The securitisation of aid is a concept which has become prominent in recent international dialogue, particularly since 9/11, the “War on Terror” and the emergence of an ideology that sees weak and fragile states as a threat to global security. Much of the debate however has been focussed at a strategic, governmental level and concerns the policy of using aid as a tool for national security and the effect this will have on humanitarian actions.  Howell and Lind describe how US ‘security interests have been sufficient to shape the objectives…and practices of aid policy…in significant ways’ (Howell and Lind, 2009: 719); Orbie and Del Biondo argue that ‘security objectives tend to dominate EU policies’ (Orbie and Del Biondo, 2015: 250); and Hameiri discusses how ‘the most notable trend of recent years in the development of the Australian overseas aid programme has been its “securitisation”’ (Hameiri, 2008).  Much less has been done concerning security and aid at the operational or tactical level, and in this regard two key areas warrant further investigation; the evolving threat to those involved in aid programmes “in the field”; and what measures can be taken to negate this threat whilst ensuring humanitarian norms and standards are maintained.

There can be no doubt that the threat to aid workers has changed, particularly since the end of the Cold War and traditional models of security based on neutrality and “good will” may no longer be effective. Whilst institutions such as the ICRC refer to themselves as ‘specifically neutral and independent’ (ICRC, 1996), increasingly, both aid organisations and the resources they deliver are being viewed by armed groups as legitimate targets, whether it be as symbols of western power, as potential hostages or for purely material gain.  Despite this many organisations continue to conduct operations under a blanket of neutrality, arguing ‘that integrated mission structures undermine the neutrality and independence of humanitarian action’ (Harmer, 2008: 528). Unfortunately there can be serious consequences for the workers themselves and the people they seek to help when this perceived form of protection fails.  On one hand, attacks often lead to the death, injury or imprisonment of the personnel involved and the loss of vital resources, as demonstrated by cases such as the violent deaths of aid workers David Haines, Alan Henning and Peter Kassig at the hands of Islamic State.  On the other, operations may be suspended or become unfeasible, such as was the case with Medecins Sans Frontieres in Afghanistan in 2004 following the targeted killing of five of its workers (Runge, 2004).  As a result, those in need receive nothing whilst the credibility of the agencies involved decreases, resulting in an impact on legitimacy in both the eyes of the people and perhaps more importantly, external donors.

As a result of the new risks posed to humanitarian actors by the changing nature of modern conflict, difficult decisions must be made regarding the protection of those involved. The significance of the principle of neutrality must be considered in relation to the importance of mission success and the safe and efficient delivery of aid, and if necessary must become subordinate to more proactive, effective security measures.  Unfortunately, where the veil of protection provided by neutrality fails, more traditional security approaches must be used to enable the ultimate humanitarian goal to be reached; that of providing assistance where it is most needed.

Whilst the use of armed protection for humanitarian missions has often been balked at, if done correctly it will serve only to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian missions at the expense of a sometimes ineffective and outdated principle.  The benefits of such an approach are fourfold; the success rate for humanitarian enterprises will increase, in turn leading to higher levels of legitimacy, credibility and international interest; the risks to aid organisations and their staff will be vastly reduced; the deterrent effect will be noticeable and will in turn enhance the security of those involved across a wider field; and the ability of armed groups to use vulnerable populations and humanitarian resources for their own ends will be greatly diminished.

As stated above, such a “protected delivery” mechanism is certainly feasible, but only if approached correctly. Military units, such as international peacekeeping forces, will often have the professionalism and capacity to undertake such a task and may lend an air of impartiality in terms of the armed actors operating within a conflict zone, for example through the use of the famous UN “blue helmet”.  Where such forces are unavailable, or impinge on an NGO’s sense of impartiality, there is the option of Private Security Companies, who through their work in Iraq and Afghanistan, have improved vastly in their ability to provide low key risk-management and security solutions.  Funding for such an enterprise is made easier through the increase in coordinated global strategies and whole-of-government approaches, and indeed, in his thesis on this very subject, Peter Voorn highlights the fact that USAID have already embraced NGO-PSC partnerships, whilst organisations such as DfID regularly use these same PSCs to protect their representatives throughout Iraq and Afghanistan (Voorn, 2011).

In conclusion, over recent years conflict has evolved, and this has led to a significant change in the threat facing humanitarian actors. Whilst this threat remains, those same actors must adapt their approach, focussing less on principles which are no longer failsafe and more on practical security solutions which enable aid to be delivered safely to those who desperately need it.

Postscript

There could be a vast array of reasons given for why an effective partnership between security and humanitarian actors is not the norm, but three major issues appear to stand out. Firstly, there is, as discussed, a focus amongst policy makers, academics and actors within both fields on the securitisation of aid as a strategy for implementing foreign policy and strengthening national security, an approach that only serves to increase the gap between security actors and those with humanitarian aims.  Secondly, the principle of impartiality is a core belief of many aid agencies and is often seen as incompatible with armed groups of any description, a view which many refuse to sway from despite the increasing risks they face in carrying out their work.  Finally, the issue of resources and funding makes a partnership difficult, be it through lack of manpower such as may be the case on peacekeeping operations, or through limited finances ruling out the use of expensive private actors.

However, whilst conflict continues to create large populations of vulnerable people and the threat to those who would help these people increases, a new, coordinated, acceptable-to-all strategy is required to enable humanitarian aid to be delivered, where it is needed, in the safest manner possible.

Reference List

Hameiri, S. (2008) ‘Risk management, neo-liberalism and the Securitisation of the Australian aid program’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 62 (3): 357 – 371.

Harmer, A. (2008) ‘Integrated Missions: A Threat to Humanitarian Security?’ International Peacekeeping 15 (4): 528 – 539.

Howell, J. and Lind, J. (2009) ‘Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan’ European Journal of Development Research 21 (5): 718 – 736.

Orbie, J. and Del Biondo, K. (2015) ‘The European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad: Securitisation and/or Compartmentalisation’ Global Society 29 (2): 243 – 259.

Plattner, D. (1996) ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance, Geneva: ICRC https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jn2z.htm , (accessed 24^th Sept 2015).

Runge, P. (2004) ‘New security threats for humanitarian aid workers’ Social Work and Society 2 (2): 233 – 236.

Voorn, P. (2011) Private security for USAID contractors: assessing a market solution for USAID security issues, http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=341519 , (accessed 23^rd Sept 2015).

Well-articulated Policies and Legitimate Local Partners – Qamaruddin Jabarkhiel

It is vital for both a conflict-affected country and its international partners to formulate policies that lead the partnered mission towards sustainable building of security and justice system in a post-conflict environment.   According to Tschirgi, N. (2004:2) ‘….despite over ten years of practice in working in post-conflict countries, governments that actively engaged in peacebuilding still do not have clear, consistent, and well-articulated policies on post-conflict peacebuilding’. The author further argues that ‘Instead, there are general calls for “policy coherence” across issue areas, pleas for “whole-of-government” approaches, and increased mechanism for policy coordination. These, however, do not add up to a strategic peacebuilding doctrine or policy framework’. In the light of such arguments, one can clearly see the negative consequences of the lack of a comprehensive strategic operational and structural conflict-prevention and peacebuilding policy in Afghanistan, one of the major post-conflict recovery missions of the 21^st century. Since October 2001, the international community has been involved in Afghanistan conducting both military and civil service operations, all the while expending tremendous amount of financial and human resources. However, the outcome compared to the resources invested is much lower than expected.

In spite of having more than 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) trained, equipped and supported by the international community, most parts in the south and eastern provinces of the country were never secured. As a result, the majority of its population left their home towns and villages and took shelter in major cities. But the ongoing security challenges in Kabul have resulted in the lack of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in ANSF and the Afghan government as a whole.  This lack of confidence has extended to the international community due to its inability to counter the insurgency and international terrorism.  Indeed, the Afghan government’s security policies have been severely criticized by ordinary Afghans, as is reflected throughout their national media.

In addition to the lack of comprehensive strategic policy during this post-conflict mission, the international community did not choose the right partners in the early stage of their intervention. The fighting factions and warlords operating under the name of “Mujahideen” were favored and supported by the international community in their fight against the radical Islamists Taliban movement and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.  However, this support was given without considering their reputation and years of involvements in a bloody civil war where their actions were often against international human rights.  In fact, many of their leaders were among the top human rights violators.  As noted by  the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) ‘ Women related to men sought by Mujahideen groups, or who have themselves resisted abduction or rape, have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed, sometimes in front of their families, or have been threatened with death by the warring factions’.  RAWA further adds that ‘A family who left Afghanistan in mid-1994 told Amnesty International how one night in March that year, members of General Dostum’s forces had entered their house in Old Mycrorayan area of Kabul and killed their daughter’. Post September 2001, the Mujahideen, including the likes of General Dostum, became major partners of the international community in post-conflict recovery.  Today General Dostum is serving as the first vice president of the country.

In the absence of a coherent policy, both the international community and the Afghan government could not balance their military and civilian operations in a complementary fashion. Due to ongoing insurgency, most of the efforts and resources were focused on the operational prevention where much less attention had been paid to the structural prevention; therefore, the victories of the international and Afghan security forces against Taliban insurgents were not sustained by civil institutions to address the root causes of the decade’s long Afghan conflict. According to Patrick, S. (2011) ‘the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism commits the United States to diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by bolstering state capacities, alleviating poverty and promoting good governance’.   But in spite of all sacrifices and great efforts by the international community, the current security situation and weak justice system continues to impel the country towards uncertainty in all aspects of life. Of particular note, security and basic justice  capacities are decreasing, poverty is at its highest level since 2001, production of illicit crops (mostly opium) is at its highest levels, and the government is one  the most corrupt systems on the globe.

According to The New York Times (2015) ‘Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official Afghan Courts Fail’. The paper further adds that ‘Frustrated by Western-inspired legal codes and a government court system widely seen as corrupt, many Afghans think that the militants’ quick and tradition-rooted rulings are their best hope for justice’.

In conclusion, it is highly recommended that the international community seriously consider two major points prior to intervention in any conflict affected country:

1. Avoid use of standard templates as copied from one conflict affected country into another one. Formulate customized policies for implementation of all military and civilian operation which is parallel to the social structure of the target conflict affected country.
2. Parties such as Mujahideen in Afghanistan, who together do not represent more than 20% of the total Afghan population, have been committing grave human rights violations against the ordinary population of the country for the last almost four decades. There are many other political, tribal, religious, academics and social groups who could better manage the post-conflict recovery if they were afforded the opportunities to partner with the international community. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the international community conduct a multi-dimensional study for better understand the operating environment and key actors therein.

In addition to good intentions, building a secure and functioning justice system, , voicing clear, consistent, and well-articulated policies, and partnering with the right representatives are vital to success. Lessons learned from the past and current post-conflict recovery missions should be embedded into any future such missions.

References:

Tschirgi, N. (2004:2) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges: http://www.operationspaix.net/recherche.html, (accessed 12 August 2014)

The Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA): http://www.rawa.org/ai-women.htm#3’ (accessed 12 August 2015)

Patrick, S. (2011:9-10) Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, New York: Oxford University Press

The New York Times (2015): http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as-official-afghan-courts-fail.html?_r=0, (accessed 13 August 2015)

Postscript Response:

As Walt, S. (2013) noted that ‘Successful counterinsurgencies require effective and legitimate local partners, however, and we never had one’. The author further explains that ‘if this war had been a real strategic priority, we would have fought it very differently. We would not have rotated commanders, soldiers, and civilian personnel in and out of the theatre as often as we did, in effect destroying institutional memory on an annual basis and forcing everyone to learn on the job’. Therefore, it can be argued that in general the main reasons that why appropriate or effective actions have not yet been taken to address the issues of security and justice is because of the lack of well-articulated policies and reliable partners, which resulted in establishment of corrupt institutions and inconsistencies in implementation of variety programs designed for building effective security and justice system.  Corruption in the security and justice institutions limited the abilities of both sectors to provide basic human security for ordinary citizens and deliver justice. Corruption and inconsistencies in the system caused unnecessary bureaucracy, involvements of security forces in taking bribes and other illicit activities, elevation in the costs associated to the court’s process and difficulties in accessibility to the system.   The international community and the Afghan government could not take necessary steps to counter corruption within the official system, but rather blame social and cultural values, where in reality, there is minimum connection of today’s corruption and historical social and cultural ways of life.  Today’s corruption and lack of institutional capacity is one of the major formal issues in the country which severely affected the ability of both national and international actors in building effective security and justice system in such post-conflict environment like Afghanistan.

Reference:

Walt, S. (2013) The Real Reason, the U.S. failed in Afghanistan: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/15/the-real-reason-the-u-s-failed-in-afghanistan/, (accessed 17 August 2015)

The Impact of Conflict on Mental Health – Tom Leadbetter

Television and social media has opened the worlds eyes to the human suffering and reality of conflict and for many the consequences of the conflicts currently taking place around the world are only too clear to see (Institute for Economics & Peace: 2015). However, there is another unseen impact of conflict which lasts long after the cessation of hostilities, those who suffer from mental health problems caused by having been witness to or subjected to traumatic events such as sexual violations, massacres, and torture (Silove: 2004). It has a serious negative impact on the populace including poverty, malnutrition, social decline and psychosocial illness and has an adverse effect on people’s physical and mental health causing, anger, depression, psychiatric disorders and social problems. Studies have shown the more a person suffers trauma the more they are likely to suffer from mental health problems (Millar-Tate: 2015). Based on the clear impact of conflict on mental health and the impact of mental health on individuals and society, targeted research needs to be done in order to inform mental health interventions in post conflict states.

The United Nations (UN) has recognised that for social development, mental health is a human right (Shawgi: 2015). Estimates from the World Health Organisation state that 10% of individuals who experience a traumatic event such as conflict will suffer serious mental health problems and another 10% will develop behaviour, resulting in them being unable to function effectively. Women and children are particularly vulnerable due to the changing face of conflict fought within states where antagonists flout humanitarian laws. (Murthy, Lakshminarayana: 2006) Taking the Syrian population of 22.5 million as an example that means there could be up to 4.5million people with potential future mental health problems (World Population Review 2015). Failure to address mental health issues post conflict will degrade efforts to promote post conflict reconstruction and will have an obvious impact on security and justice in post conflict peace building (Montgomery, Rondinelli: 2004). Long-term effects of untreated mental health issues can lead to heart disease, stroke and impaired growth and development in children (Ameresekere, Henderson: 2012).

Unfortunately there are very little studies, which show how a post-country state may deal with post conflict mental health issues (Millar Tate: 2015). One of the outstanding issues continually brought to light by many of the mental health articles was the lack of information on the evaluation of programs and that there were few population studies carried out in conflict areas and low income countries (The World Bank 2003). Millar-Tate (2015) states that even though there are proven links between diminished ability for productive social engagement, no research has been carried out on individuals in the reconciliation process. For a subject that could potentially have a serious impact on a countries progress in post conflict peace building this is staggering.

It is unfortunate but true that any type of mental health issue is underfunded and has a lower priority than physical illness where many organisations focus on the physical and economic impacts of post-conflict peace building (Ameresekere, Henderson: 2010). Almost 1% of the people in the world are currently displaced persons or refugees (Summerfield: 2000) and with more conflicts erupting daily that number will only get higher. Mental health problems both for those who remain in post conflict states and those who leave all have a negative effect on individuals, the country of origin and the receiving country. Failure to address the issues of mental health during peace building will hinder human development, lead to insecurity, break up families and communities and displace populations (The World Bank: 2003).

Mental health problems should be addressed in a post conflict society by improving the mental health provision including further empirical research into the causes of mental health issues in conflict countries to support conflict recovery. Indications show that there are ways to implement cost-effective programs across many different sectors with different approaches. Now is the time for western nations to realise and address the mental health issues, which exist in these conflict countries rather than the indifference currently shown. What is required is targeted research in order to inform and address mental health interventions in post conflict and low-income states. An increased understanding of the issues of mental health in post conflict societies would allow the development of a mental health policy to meet the mental health needs of not only the individual but ultimately the country. Interventions may also contribute to dealing with the anger and depression felt by many survivors of conflict.

Part 2

Mental health is a challenging topic to address throughout the world even in stable, peaceful states. There is also the social stigma of mental health with many stereotypical views and discrimination. This situation is exacerbated by cultural and religious beliefs. Since mental health is also more challenging to diagnose and identify it is often dismissed as a first world luxury or a reaction to stress and suffering. Since many symptoms of mental health disorders also can relate to other physical illnesses it is difficult to clearly provide proof to the average person. Since diagnosis is challenging and proving results of treatment is more difficult most development interventions do not target mental health during post conflict reconstruction. People either don’t understand or organisations want more for their money with tangible results they can show. Dealing with mental health can also be complex and with a scarcity of professionals in a war torn country it is even more difficult. However the fact that it is difficult does not mean that it should not be addressed, only by recognising and dealing with these issues can societies and organisations compile effective policies and strategies to deal with them. The ‘rubber band’ model of mental health used by many aid organisations working off the principle that people would revert back to normal once they had the basic necessities such as food, water and shelter is just not viable nor sustainable (Baingana, Bannon, Thomas: 2005). If the problem is not addressed and underestimated it will lead to a greater number of people to treat with poor health, mental illnesses such as depression all of which is inhibitive to building a successful, peaceful and sustainable country. The outcome may even mean that there is no relapse into post conflict violence.

References

Ameresekere, M. Henderson, D. (2010) ‘Post- Conflict Mental Health in South Sudan: Overview of Common Psychiatric Disorders. Part 1: Depression and post-traumatic Stress Disorder’. http://www.southsudanmedicaljournal.com/archive/february-2012/post-conflict-mental-health-in-south-sudan-overview-of-common-psychiatric-disorders.-part-1-depression-and-post-traumatic-stress-disorder.html (accessed 15th Aug 2015).

Baingana, F. Bannon, I. Thomas, R. (2005) ‘Mental Health and Conflicts: Conceptual Framework and Approaches’, World Bank Human Development Network. http://hpod.pmhclients.com/pdf/baingana-mental-health.pdf (accessed 17th Aug 2015).

Institute for Economics & Peace. (2015) ‘Global Peace Index’ http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf (accessed 16^th Aug 2015).

Millar Tate, A (2015) ‘The Globalised World Post: The Effects of War-Related Mental Health issues on Post-Conflict Reconciliation and Transitional Justice’ http://thegwpost.com/2015/01/24/the-effects-of-war-related-mental-health-issues-on-post-conflict-reconciliation-and-transitional-justice/  (accessed 15^th Aug 2015).

Montgomery, D, J. Rondinelli, A, D. (2004) ‘Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience’ Palgrave MacMillan, New York.

Murthy, S, R. Lakshminarayana, R. (2006) ‘Mental Health consequences of war: a brief review of research findings’, World Psychiatry 5 (1) 25: 30 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1472271/ (accessed 16^th Aug 2015).

Sayed, D, G. (2011) ‘Mental Health in Afghanistan: Burden, Challenges and the Way Forward’, The World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1095698140167/MHinAfghanistan.pdf (accessed 17th Aug 2015).

Shawgi, M. (2015) ‘Sudan’s Great Depression: Mental illness dangerously ignored by country’s health services’, African Arguments.  http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/08/sudans-greatdepression-mental-illness-dangerously-ignored-by-countrys-health-services-by-dr-mohamed-shawgi/ (accessed 17^th Aug 2015).

Silove, D. (2004) ‘The challenges facing mental health programs for post-conflict and refugee communities’,  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15453165 (accessed 15th Aug 2015).

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‘Water, water everywhere, nor any drop to drink’: how the mismanagement of fresh water can act as a threat multiplier within the International Community – Robert Reynolds

As the old maritime mantra in the title clearly reminds us all, the majority of the earth’s surface is covered in bodies of water that remain undrinkable without the heavy industrial input of processes like desalinisation. This has in turn made ‘…securing a reliable supply of clean water one of the most important issues throughout human history’ (The World Economic Forum, 2015: 46), irrespective of the culture or its geographic location.

Since 2012, The World Economic Forum’s research has shown that the concerns relating to the different stresses on the worlds fresh water supplies has consistently appeared in the top five global risks in terms of both likelihood and impact to the international community (The World Economic Forum, 2015). Information cited in the most recent report from the think tank shows a decrease in the availability of fresh water as the most preeminent concern for not only the immediate future but, also the next decade as well. The concern about the accessibility to fresh water was placed above other recognisable media headline topics, including infectious diseases, weapons of mass destruction, interstate conflict and the failure of climate change adaptation. However, according to The World Economic Forum (2015) and the qualitative research that was conducted, the different global causes and effects of these diverse concerns do not occur in strict isolation from one another. The investigation by the body postulated that they are in fact interrelated happenings, with the fresh water theme displaying a moderate to strong interconnectedness with the spread of infectious diseases, profound social instability, large-scale involuntary migration and interstate conflict.

Furthermore, The World Bank has previously suggested that the likelihood of ‘rapidly deteriorating water availability [that] cuts across existing tensions and weak institutions’ (The World Bank, 2011: 35) could drive conflict and increase the threat of violence in weak and fragile states. Alternatively, ratified ‘water treaties have shown signs of success in reducing the risks of violence’ (The World Bank, 2011: 230), especially in areas that suffer from intense resource competition and limited water availability. Yet, in the strictest sense, the access to fresh water is not a direct threat to the security of people or property, however, it can be considered a credible threat multiplier that reinforces and mobilises conventional security threat mediums (Reisinger, 2015), as well as potentially acting as ‘a threat catalyst for [future] conflict’ (Reisinger, 2015: 22).

The absolute importance of water to individuals and nation states is beyond reproach, as it holds a direct primacy as the common denominator in the water-food-energy formula, which is why on several occasions in recent history competition for the resource has negatively influenced interstate relations and led to some severe diplomatic censure (Reisinger, 2015). Specifically, ‘…In 2013, Egyptian President Morsi threatened Ethiopia with war if it continued construction of a dam’ (Reisinger, 2015: 16) that would alter the flow of the Nile, and ‘the border tensions in Kashmir are in no small way a function of water security’ (Reisinger, 2015: 18). Certain elements of the Pakistan administration have even previously went as far as to threaten India with retaliatory nuclear strikes if the upper riparian state alters the flow of the Indus River.

As it stands currently within the global foreign policy climate, major armed conflicts between different states or intrastate actors over freshwater resources ‘[is] extremely rare’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 189). However, previous history has shown that violence over the commodity is not unheard of, and modern ‘empirical research has found some evidence linking water resources to international conflict’ (Stuart and Brown, 2007: 238). Furthermore, if the neo-Malthusian theory about resource consumption is proven correct, and both the national and international policies concerning the ownership and usage of freshwater sources remains unchanged. Then ‘we should expect the competition for resources to get ever fiercer, eventually to the point that it may break the norms of nonviolent behaviour, perhaps even within and between democracies’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 189).

To help avoid these violent and detrimental neo-Malthusian predictions concerning resource scarcity and its potential linkage to future armed conflict, this position paper highlights the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and cooperation between riparian actors at a local, regional and international level. There is also an urgent requirement to legitimise the necessary international water management and cooperation efforts through the ratification of the UN 1997 Convention of the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, something that China still strongly refutes as an infringement towards its national sovereignty (Reisinger, 2015). Finally, future concepts like the water management research project conducted in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia, which was described in The World Economic Forum (2015), is an excellent example of pre-emptive cornucopian innovation for a shared national resource such as freshwater. The research has provided working models that can successfully track the availability of freshwater supplies using transparent online information, and this in turn has subsequently ‘buil[t] trust in the data [that] is critical for effective policy’ in a multi-stakeholder environment (The World Economic Forum, 2015:46).

Postscript

The largest issue arrayed against the development and implementation of effective freshwater policy and management systems for local, regional and international community blocs is the severe lack of understanding about the environmental ‘processes that are still well beyond the control of man’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 187). Furthermore, not only is the scientific data that relates to water scarcity and the ‘neo-Malthusian scenario[s] of river conflict’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 182) limited, it is, much like climate change, also full of conjecture and conflicting research conclusions. This ultimately hampers the development of effective frameworks that can or should be universally endorsed by all states worldwide to help improve human security.

However, from a more pragmatic, political perspective, the ratification of treaties concerning transnational resources will always be a difficult bureaucratic undertaking, especially when one party within the process may be much more negatively affected by the changes that are under discussion. The challenge of successfully accommodating all actors during a diplomatic process remains one of the most difficult endeavours for development researchers and practitioners alike. However, with that understood, the seriousness of access to sustainable freshwater in the future cannot be overstated, with the failure in dialogue between opposing riparian claims leading to the potential for armed conflict, particularly as the stresses (be it manmade or natural) increase.

References

Gleditsch, N. (2007) ‘Environmental Change, Security, and Conflict’ in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall (eds) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 177-195.

Reisinger, A. (2015) ‘Enhancing Global Security through Fresh Water Security’ A Journal of National Security Studies United States Naval War College Spring (2015): 15-24.

Stewart, F. and Brown, G. (2007) ‘Motivations For Conflict’ in C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall (eds) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 219-241.

The World Economic Forum (2015) Global Risks 2015: 10th Edition, Insight Report, Geneva: World Economic Forum.

The World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Pursuing Justice for Human Rights Abuses in Post Conflict Societies – Timothy Robinson

This position paper seeks to address the importance of pursuing justice for human rights abuses in post conflict societies. In order to produce an adequate position it is important to define the meaning of human rights in the context of this paper.  Every human being, man, woman or child, regardless of ethnic group, colour, religion, sexual orientation or place of birth, is inherently entitled to be afforded human rights.  This means that every human being has a right to be free from persecution or torture, unlawful imprisonment or execution without due process and judged equally without discrimination (OHCHR, 2015).

The importance of addressing human rights abuses in post conflict societies has created a huge difference of opinion amongst experts and academics who seek to find a solution to the dilemmas associated with the coexistence of justice for human rights abuses and conflict resolution. Since the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), those involved in the process of brokering peace between warring factions have argued that actors who are potentially guilty of war crimes are reluctant to negotiate a peace deal or relinquish power for fear of prosecution (HRW, 2009). The aim of this paper is to demonstrate examples of why conflict resolution cannot work without justice and human rights being at the core of its peace initiative. Ignoring human rights abuse in the Sudanese peace negotiations led to further human rights atrocities in Darfur as the Sudanese government believed they could act with impunity (HRW, 2009). The lack of justice for human rights violations in Afghanistan also led to a rise in insurgency, fragile peace and further human rights abuse (Niland, 2010).  I will argue that justice and conflict resolution are not incompatible entities and focus on the idea that if the two worked in unison they may fill the voids that exist in both theories and therefore create a more sustainable peace (Parlevliet, 2010). 

In 2005 a peace agreement was reached in Kenya ending the civil war in Sudan. The UN Security Council did nothing to address the human rights abuses that had taken place during the conflict, for fear of destabilising the peace process (HRW, 2009).  HRW (2009) argue that this resulting impunity may have led to further human rights abuses in Darfur due to the peace negotiations in Nairobi failing to address the issues surrounding accountability for atrocities committed in South Sudan during the conflict.  By the mid-1990s peace negotiations, and consequently peace agreements, were expected to include integrated methods of dealing with the accountability of previous human rights violations.  However, past regimes have often depended on the likelihood of immunity from prosecution.  Without the promise of amnesty from past violations, threats of military aggression leading to a destabilisation of the peace process have frequently led to impending charges being dropped (Popkin, 2000).  This is debatably the reason why the Inter-Governmental Authority Development (IGAD) peace process has refused to include civil rights organisations, thus rendering it impossible for ordinary Sudanese people to bring about cases of human rights abuses.  While human rights abuses in the south may have abated since the signing of the Machakos Accord in 2002, similar crimes against humanity are being committed in Darfur with impunity (Young, 2005).

As part of the US led operation “Enduring Freedom” in 2001, International military powers summoned the help of Mujahedin warlords to overthrow the Taliban. With the help of international actors, the warlords (many of whom had been involved in human rights abuses in Afghanistan’s recent history) were brought into the post-Taliban government.  The inclusion of accused war criminals removed the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of ordinary Afghans, and brought about an ethos of impunity and illegality (HRW, 2009).  The failure of the government and international actors to prosecute those who violated the human rights of many Afghans has led to a culture that lacks justice and accountability and an abuse of government powers.  The cessation of armed conflict is extremely unlikely until justice and accountability have been restored.   The pursuit of forming government institutions and winning the US led ‘war on terror’ has meant that human rights and justice have been neglected, which has led to continued instability in Afghanistan (Niland, 2010) (HRW, 2009).

Justice for human rights abuses is not at the core of the conflict resolution process because justice can often be a hindrance for peace negotiators when trying to achieve short term objectives within the conflict resolution process. Human rights can often cause an escalation or recurrence of violence, which can lead to warring factions dismissing agreements because of an issue over human rights becoming more important than brokering a ceasefire (Mretus and Helsing, 2006) (HRW, 2009).  During the peace negotiations in Bosnia in 1993 a United Nations official said that the human rights community had hindered a possible peace agreement (Mertus and Helsing, 2006).  The UN official’s reference to ‘the human rights community’ suggests that they are viewed as separate entities.  The statement also indicates that the importance of human rights is not fully recognised in peace negotiations.

It is the author’s opinion that human rights and conflict resolution/transformation should be treated as one entity. This approach is likely to create an accurately coherent analysis of what is required to build sustainable peace (Parlevliet, 2010).  Both Parlevliet (2010) and Nderitu (2010) discuss the gaps between conflict resolution and human rights, and this sheds some interesting light on two concepts that would initially appear to be elements of the same entity.  The fundamental difference between the two is that the human rights viewpoint tends to look at ways in which war is conducted and not the illegality of the conflict itself.  Conflict transformation focuses on other (non-violent) means of finding peace. Dissension between the two may arise when the demands substantiated by the principles of human rights lead to an escalation in hostilities and limit the effectiveness of conflict transformation (Schmelzle and Dubouet, 2010). However, when conflict transformation is viewed from a human rights perspective, it brings about the consideration of who will play a role in government and how governance will be structured (Parlevliet, 2010); this point is relevant to the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan, based on the opinion that the government is illegitimate because of the impunity afforded to its officials for previous human rights violations (Niland, 2010). It is widely thought that a greater emphasis on human rights is essential when considering the restructuring of conflict transformation.  The consolidation of the two will lead to a better understanding of sustainable peace in the aftermath of conflict (Parlevliet, 2010) (Nderitu, 2010) (Schmelzle and Dubouet, 2010).

References        

Human Rights Watch (2009), Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, New York: Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0709webwcover_3.pdf.

Nderitu, M. (2010), ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, V. Dudouet and B. Schmelzle (Eds.) Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: The Challenges of Just Peace, Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, available at http://www.berghofhandbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue9_humanrights_complete.pdf, pp.55-64.

Niland, N. (2010). Impunity and insurgency: a deadly combination in Afghanistan. International Review of the Red Cross. Volume 92, No. 880, pp.931-936.

Parlevliet, M. (2010), ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, V. Dudouet and B. Schmelzle (Eds.) Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: The Challenges of Just Peace, Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, available at http://www.berghofhandbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue9_humanrights_complete.pdf, pp.15-46.

Popkin, M (2000). Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador: Peace without Justice. Pennsylvania, USA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. p85.

Schmelzle and Dubouet (2010), ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, V. Dudouet and B. Schmelzle (Eds.) Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: The Challenges of Just Peace, Berlin: Berghof Conflict Research, available at http://www.berghofhandbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue9_humanrights_complete.pdf, pp.5-13

OHCHR. (2015). what are human rights? Available: http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx. Last accessed 22nd September 2015.

Mertus, J. Helsing, J (2006). Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding. USA: United States Institute of Peace. pp.509-512.

Young, J. (2005). Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace. Review of African Political Economy, Imperialism & African Social Formations. Volume 32, No. 103, pp. 99-113

Unity of Effort and Effective Collaboration or Disarray in Practice? – Anthony Thomas

Introduction

Post conflict peacebuilding, institute and state building is performed by a diverse range of actors, alongside state institutions where strategic objectives and mandates fall under the umbrella of ‘unity of effort,’ integrated with local ownership.  The gap between policy and practice is well documented, and this article will begin with citing the current migration crisis as an exemplar of the strategic and political drive towards an optimistic, constructive and coordinated approach amongst the European states. Furthermore, the article will then study the effectiveness, or otherwise, of cooperation, collaboration and coordination of security sector reform in practice.

Current Position

Cooperation, collaboration and coordination amongst the European entities is fundamental, requiring a multidimensional assignment on the ground to stabilise the situation across Europe, and in order to prevent further humanitarian, psycho-social suffering and tragic loss of life. Resolutions will not be developed without its challenges, implementation likewise. Notably, the Secretary General is urging European leaders to ensure unity, solidarity and responsibility, besides the appropriate assistance to be provided to refugees and migrants, as difficult discussions take place between Europe’s interior ministers on such crisis (The Guardian 2015). In this regard, and the crux of the writers’ argument, will there be solidarity at a strategic and policy level, and how will this be translated into effective action in practice?

The current conflict landscape, coupled with the migration crisis moving across Europe from countries such as Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan are heart rendering, moreover it is complex phenomenon and multifaceted in nature due to ongoing political, economic and social instability. Furthermore, humanitarian institutions, civilian and political leaders are gravely concerned as the social suffering unfolds daily, which is depicted across a range of social and media channels. The route from war to peace for thousands is overwhelming, with peace a distant dream, or such an aspiration that is difficult and dangerous to achieve. As the Secretary-General commented he is concerned regarding the predicament facing migrants who are fleeing conflict and oppression (Ki Moon 2015: n.p.).

Challenges

Challenges remain, as the drafting and implementation of such strategies being discussed in Brussels may well be problematic. Reinforcing this perspective, Anderson (2011) asserts that turning strategy into realisation in fragile states is complex and challenging, whereas Sedra (2009) argues that there is a division between policy and practice divide with SSR in a post-conflict area. Studying the root causes of such unprecedented migration flows, Donais (2014) argues that institutional capacities can only be restored if national actors undertake ownership during the post conflict period, whereas Hartzell (2011) argues that reform programmes in a post war setting vary owing to the conflict related conditions. Designing such a strategy for the current migration crisis requires a long term vision, underpinned by what Sedra (2010: 6) describes in terms of SSR as a ‘whole of government coordination,’ that demands a structured framework and the coordination of effort between institutions and sectors.

Coordination, Cooperation, Collaboration in the field?

In theatre, strategies, directives, mission mandates and targets are commonplace. Similarly such words as horizontal cooperation, collaboration, coordination, cross cutting and unity of effort reverberates daily. Whilst interconnection, bi-lateral arrangements and common objectives are crucial in a post conflict society, capacity building and local ownership is at times problematic and a noteworthy issue. Coordination, synchronisation and multi donor meetings are abundant, where renamed fora are frequent, underwritten at times by the phrase ‘bottom up approach’ locally owned and driven.

An exemplar of a multi-agency meeting recently was summarised in terms of alignment and coordination with counterparts and donor partners; using a common approach to identify overlaps or collaboration opportunities early on; besides common policy approaches and the need to identify any programming overlaps/conflicts, an outcome many years following post conflict reconstruction and the commencement of many development programmes. Enthusiasm, professionalism and the desire to drive projects and state institutions are evident, however, occasionally subjective agendas and the want to reinvent the wheel is unmistakeable where ‘mission creep’ can ensue. Developing these arguments further, Chetail (2009: 13) asserts, ‘the major operational difficulty lies in coordinating a multitude of civilian and military actors whose areas of expertise are extremely diverse,’ while Hanggi (2009) argues that there most SSR programmes are instigated and financed by multilateral and donor organisations, who impose their knowledge and expertise, and where local resistance is evident, they will use political leverage to progress. Underscoring these observations Oosterveld and Galand (2012) claim:

Another important reason why donors often remain and want to remain in the driver’s seat is because they are usually involved with serious financial commitments often constituting the bulk of the spending allocated for reform initiatives (2012: 201).

Moreover, de Coning (2014: n.p.) argues that a number of actors can interfere too much, where such behaviour or style of engagement becomes intrusion, adding to the fragility of the state.

What needs to be done and why?

Thus, all actors involved in building security and justice in post-conflict environments need to appreciate that SSR programmes or similar reform programmes are complex and multifaceted, requiring all-encompassing engagement, and mindful of duplication of effort. Whilst institutional procedures may be diverse, the World Bank (2006) assert:

Improvement in project selectivity and prioritization would help to limit overburdening of government capacity and enable better absorption of resources (2006: 11).

Consequently, all providers of technical assistance and those concerned with political development should ensure coherence at the strategic and operational level, and not collaborative competition through power dynamics or power relationships. Needless to say there is no one solution or formula to restore security, embed the rule of law or to achieve institutional and social transformation. Success is difficult to define, however, to minimise misunderstanding in practice, state building requires the commitment and political will from the national institutions and the requirement for them to be in the driving seat, embracing and directing the strategies. This claim is further corroborated by Panarelli (2010) who maintains that local involvement is necessary to incorporate issues and priorities.

References

Anderson, L. R. (2011) ‘Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding’, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 2011:31, Denmark, http://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/security_sector_reform_and_the_dilemmas_of_liberal_peacebuilding_1.pdf, (accessed 22^nd September 2015).

Chetail, V. ( 2009) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

de Coning, C. (2014) Can the New Deal for Fragile States Live Up To its Promise to Significantly Shift Agency to the Local?, http://g4dpblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/can-new-deal-for-fragile-states-live-up.html, (accessed 23^rd September 2015).

Donais, T. (2014) ‘National Ownership and post-conflict peace building: From principle to practice’. Policy Brief No 43.The Centre for International Governance Innovation. https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_pb_43.pdf, (accessed 23^rd September 2015)

Oosterveld, W. and Galand, R. (2012) ‘Justice Reform, Security Sector Reform and Local Ownership.’ Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4 (1): 194 -209.

Hänggi, H. (2009) ‘Security Sector Reform’, in Chetail V Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hartzell, C.A. (2011) ‘Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR and SSR in Afghanistan’. United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR270-Missed_Opportunities_0.pdf

Ki Moon, B, (2015) Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the situation facing refugees and migrants in Europe, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8994, (accessed 23^rd September 2015).

Panarelli, L. (2010) ‘Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform’, United States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB11%20Local%20Ownership%20of%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf

Sedra, M. (2009) e – Conference Report: The Future of Security Sector Reform, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, https://www.cigionline.org/publications/2009/7/future-security-sector-reform,  (accessed 23^rd September 2015).

Sedra, M. (2010) Security Sector Reform 101; Understanding the Concept, Charting Trends and Identifying Challenges, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssr_101_final_april_27.pdf

The Guardian (2015) Refugee crisis: EU ministers to discuss binding quotas – as it happened, http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/sep/22/refugee-crisis-eu-ministers-to-discuss-binding-quotas-live-updates#block-56015073e4b0ae9eeb187f31, (accessed 23^rd September 2015).

World Bank (2006) Progress on Strengthening Collaboration With United Nations Partners in Post-Conflict Countries, International Development Association Operations Policy and Country Services Fragile States Unit, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/IDA14_Replenishment/Mid-Term/IDANETPC.pdf, (accessed 23^rd September 2015).

Response 

Cooperation, collaboration and coordination are key elements in reconstruction and redevelopment in post conflict settings. Units, agencies and organisations, who have a common interests and goals, should work together in harmony to make their efforts more compatible, effective and efficient, besides implementing a shared vision of security. Furthermore, partnership working allows those to share their skills, knowledge and experience, where decision making is based on a collaborative approach. Such efforts require a structured and accountable mechanism to fulfil the overarching strategic policy, as security in fragile or post conflict state is a prerequisite for social, economic development, human rights and long term peace.

The issues of cooperation, collaboration and coordination are addressed on a regular basis, and will continue in the future. Lessons learned, doctrines, policies and academic articles have covered this topic and attempts made to ensure shoulder to shoulder, and the cooperative implementation of common programmes and cross cutting initiatives. However, and as highlighted previously, post conflict involves a vast amount of partners, regional bodies, donors, civilian and military agencies have different procedures, cultures, languages, mandates and agendas, which is without personal views. Subsequently bridging and bringing together individual institutions is far from simple, and will not be without its challenges in the future. Hence why local / state ownership is a central principle in SSR programmes. The drive and political commitment is required from the beleaguered state and their principal national entities, with the readiness to engage and politically govern, otherwise programmes become weak, unsustainable and lost on the ground, where institutional development in the areas of security and justice fade.

SCID September 2014 Intake

Dividing the Threat Multiplier:  An Argument for Effective International Prosecution
Against Grand Corruption and Kleptocratic Regimes – Maren Moon

The release of the Panama Papers by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has fuelled spectacular revelations regarding the scale of grand corruption and the wider system which enables it (ICIJ, 2016: np).  The scandal is exposing involvement by the very people and institutions who should feel morally and legally compelled to act with the highest integrity but who instead participate in a system all too frequently perpetrating wholesale crime, undue privilege, and the global erosion of security.  (Wolf, 2014: 3). They are doing so with impunity, and they are doing so while the world’s watchdogs cannot help but possess full knowledge that ‘the link between grand corruption and mass human rights violations is undeniable’ (Freedom House, 2014, and also Woodrow Wilson Center, 2016: np., and Transparency International: 2008, ).

No less than heads of states and global financial institutions linked to London, New York and Switzerland have now been connected to an enormous shadow economy responsible for: hiding assets; exercising bribery; facilitating tax evasion; practicing financial fraud; enabling drug trafficking; and participating in sexploitation. (See ICIJ, 2016 and Huffington Post a, 2016, Huffington Post b, 2016: np, and BBCb, 2016: np ). And no fewer than 11 million documents have laid bare the global elite’s participation in a system purposefully rigged to increase the gap between the absurdly wealthy and the tragically poor.  The international community would do well to note too that this is a system which facilitates crime in desperate and conflict-vulnerable settings while arming the insurgents and terrorists who operate from within such settings (Patrick, 2009 and Napoleoni, 2003). We should also recall the system intentionally erodes democratic principles of transparency, fair taxation, the right to peaceful protest, and the exercise of free speech (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2016: np and Wolf, 2014: 5-8).  In short, this is a system wherein leaders and criminals alike actively undermines everything to which the international community aspires, and for which it ultimately endeavours; sometimes selflessly and in conditions of great hardship.

It should not go unrecognised that the responses of those who have been unveiled as both witting and unwitting participants in the darker aspects of this economy, all too consistently reiterate a mantra which should give each of us a moment’s pause for reflection – that lawyers and financial experts alike still possess the legal means of perpetrating unfair, corrupt, and increasingly unfair and corrupting practices. Vested interests in lofty positions have suggested big businesses, and their high-flying personnel, need to work in the shadow economy even when it lowers opportunities for smaller businesses and honest entrepreneurs.  They argue further that legislation against bribery ‘puts British companies at a competitive disadvantage’ (Barrington, 2016: 4). And yet still too, others have intoned that society needs to tacitly accommodate unethical practices in the financial sector on the grounds that businesses in their countries are too big to fail, or too important to risk having relocate to another country. But in making these accommodations we will be enabling the capture of entire governments by organisations whose interests do not include the common citizens who eke by and sustain the infrastructure enjoyed by those who have rigged the system against them (Johnson, 2009: np).  Such accommodation could only serve to entrench profit for the few at the cost of the many. We are, in effect, now experiencing parallel attacks on democracy by the licit and illicit economies alike – both of whom are seemingly melding into a deeper, more committed relationship in an increasingly shady capacity and whose political-economy will forever thwart the international community’s efforts in bringing peace and security.

Those who evade tax legally are allowed to escape criminality by conveniently structured legal technicalities. This phenomena is relatively easy to rectify. But the Big King Kleptocrats who knowingly act outside the law, do so understanding that successful prosecution against their acts is nearly unheard of. History and statistics remain firmly on their side. This is occurring regardless of corruption’s increasingly evident role in destabilising entire continents such as Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Central and South America (Carnegie, 2015).  These actors smile comfortably while insinuating that exposure of their misdeeds might expose a larger, darker reality in which too many purportedly clean-skinned actors may also be complicit.

And while they may not be kind, they most certainly are proving wise.

Indeed, these same kleptocrats, and their advisors, will have followed closely the freedom and riches once more enjoyed by Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak who has now escaped charges of corruption and murder on a mere technicality (Reuters, 2015: np). Mubarak was a kleptocratic despot whose legacy includes death, blood, fear, and a deeply troubled country. He did not operate in a vacuum, and he was aided by the most powerful regimes in the world. But that does not excuse the outcome – nor does it justify the continuance of such behaviour. Those choosing to play in the dirty sandbox of blood and money in today’s shadow economy will have either dismissed the importance of the Arab Spring’s impact on security and human rights or cynically regarded the situation as yet another opportunity from which to leverage additional millions.  I argue that humanity can no longer afford such cynicism.

I further assert these same actors will have understood President Goodluck Jonathan’s dismissal of his bank governor following the well-intended public servant’s disclosure to the ‘Nigerian Senate that the treasury was missing billions of dollars in expected oil revenue’ (Wolf, 2014: 5). Indeed, Jonathan and his cronies seemed content to turn a blind eye to the networks which channelled money and arms to Boko Haram while leaving security forces ill equipped to quell an uprising which has now left more than 10,000 civilians and security personnel dead at the hands of Islamist savagery (Foreign Policy, 2015: np).

The kleptocrats will have further monitored the toppling of corrupt regimes in Tunisia and the Ukraine and reacted like narcissistic sociopaths unable to emotionally register the gravity of their actions, while concurrently making plans to fly to safety while maintaining access to their ill-gotten gains if the same danger knocks on their door.

The impunity enjoyed by this cohort, and structured into our globalised economy, has paved the way for much of the harm we see unfolding on the world’s stage. It has also provided resonant and compelling reasons from which the so called Islamic State, Boko Haram, and the Taliban find a seemingly endless supply of recruits (Chayes, 2007: 22, and Woodrow Wilson Center, 2016: np, and Schirch as cited in Mertus and Helsing, 2009: 68).

Whether knowingly or not, every last player in the shadow economy has contributed to an encroaching threat against humanity and which serves as nothing short of a security threat multiplier. It is of epic and global proportions.

The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa provides an immediate example of how easily corruption might impact security on a global scale. UN donor contributions topping $5.2bn were dispersed to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea.  Almost all of it vanished, and only a fraction of the disbursement was ever audited. ‘In all three countries, no individual has been tried, much less convicted, for their role in the mismanagement of money meant to save the lives of the dying’ (Al Jazeera, 2016: np.).  These funds were also intended to contain the outbreak and prevent its spread.  The UN’s Global Ebola Response data refers to the outbreak’s nature as having been of ‘widespread and intense transmission’ (UN, 2014: np). But to date, the myriad pages and resources on their website speak only of a level of need and the current status of the situation.  Their silence of the flagrant misappropriation of funds perpetuates impunity.  And such complicit behaviour could very well facilitate a new pandemic of Ebola or some other virus, which experts warn could be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to halt if not contained early, and with the utmost care; care which could never result in the face of another round of missing but badly needs funds (Oxford Martin School, 2012: np).

Grand Corruption further impacts security by destabilising regions in concussive shock waves. As migrants flee corrupt regimes and insurgencies (again, simultaneously fostered by the shadow economy), we see communities decimated, resentments grow, borders close, and trust diminish. (BBCa 2015: np,). Actions originating thousands of miles away from Europe’s shores are now threatening the cohesiveness of European states and the long architected interdependence of the EU.   The Schengen Agreement is further threatened as once ceded sovereignty is being repossessed by politicians seeking to erect borders and control the influx of desperate people fleeing the regimes which grand corruption has enabled.

Finally, kleptocracy feeds the thickening of the crime-conflict nexus as human traffickers, arms dealers, and smugglers share mutually beneficial relationships with terrorists, insurgents and the ruling elite. The nexus will continue to thicken so long as the chaotic conditions and lack of governance resulting from unabated kleptocracy ensures the conditions favourable to its growth.  (see Patrick, 2009,  and Lacher, 2012, and McMullin, 2009, and Jesperson, 2015 and Sloan and Cockayne, 2011).

And it is for these reasons, and so many more, that we must strive to end impunity for grand corruption – and the shadow economy in which it thrives.   Such a task will require concerted, relentless multilateral efforts and incredible political will.  But it can, and must be done.

We can begin by seizing opportunity from the momentum gathering in the wake of the Panama Papers and the associated Unaoil scandals in current headlines.  We can further reach out across the international community and form inter-organisational working teams to apply pressure on host-countries, the Bretton Woods institutions, and home governments.   We can institute training programs which dispel the activities which remain shrouded in mystery but whose reality can be unpacked in simple terms.  But most of all, we must challenge the sovereignty of those countries who refuse to participate in fair trade and good governance – and we must have an international court with both the will and capacity to challenge the problem.  And that court must somehow operate separately from the arbitrary and political interests of the United Nations Permanent 5.

But it has to start. Impunity has to end. And accountability must follow. And never has there been a more pressing time.

Postscript

As a post-script to my previous position piece, I would like to gently assert that the International Community has understandably tolerated grand corruption in the theatres of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The conditions in many of these theatres have necessitated that our precious resources be used first to protect lives and second to institute the ground-level security needed to maintain sufficient equilibrium from which to begin the long, hard institutionalisation of security sector reform, transitional justice, and micro-development projects.  But this too provides another reason why the solution to grand corruption requires an international effort outside the influence of the P5 (whose own members might be guilty of grand corruption or geopolitics).  We must seek a solution which can pre-empt the looting of banks and act independently of outside political agendas which might situate a vulnerable country between winning and losing scenarios as powerful countries battle for control by proxy. We need a solution which sends a clear signal to corrupt elites across the entire world, and not simply those situated in areas of conflict, that corruption will no longer be tolerated, nor paid for by blood of innocent people.  But we, the donor countries, must see to our own houses first.  We must ensure our hands are clean and that any authority we exercise is comprised of substance and never hollow in its nature. We must lead from the front, and from genuine experience.  But we simply cannot afford to turn away from this issue – at home or abroad.  People are dying by guns and by starvation; and they are dying by torture when taking action to stop the atrocity at hand while having inadequate support behind and beside them.  We must be that support.

References

Al Jazeera Media (2016) The plunder of west Africa Ebola funds. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/plunder-west-africa-ebola-funds-160125140155872.html (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

BBC (2016) Migration and citizenship, start the week – BBC radio 4. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06ybg7h (Accessed: 3 April 2016).

BBC (2016) Panama papers: What the documents reveal. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-35956055 (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Barrington, R. (2016) ‘Spot the Difference: Corruption Research, Academies and NGOs’, British Academy: British Academy. pp. 1–7.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2014) Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/corruption_and_security.pdf (Accessed: 14 March 2015).

Chayes, S. (2007) ‘Days of Lies and Roses: Selling Out Afghanistan’, Boston Review, , pp. 21–23.

Foreign Policy (2015) In Nigeria, $2 Billion in Stolen Funds is Just a Drop in the Corruption Bucket. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/18/in-nigeria-2-billion-in-stolen-funds-is-just-a-drop-in-the-corruption-bucket/ (Accessed: 20 November 2015).

Freedom House (2014) ‘Combating Impunity: Transnational Justice and Anti-Corruption’, Washington, DC: Freedom House. pp. 1–10.

Huffington Post (2016) Big Banks Aided Firm at Center of International Bribery Scandal. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/unaoil-citibank-hsbc_us_56feba02e4b0daf53aefa1da (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Huffington Post (2016) There’s A huge new corporate corruption scandal. Here’s why everyone should care. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/unaoil-bribery-scandal-corruption_us_56fa2b06e4b014d3fe2408b9 (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

ICIJ (2016) Giant leak of offshore financial records exposes global array of crime and corruption. Available at: https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

ICIJ (2016) The Panama papers. Available at: https://panamapapers.icij.org/ (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Jesperson, S. (2015) ‘Development Engagement with Organized Crime: a Necessary Shift or Further Securitisation?’, Conflict, Security, & Development, 15(1), pp. 23–50.

Johnson, S. (2009) The Quiet Coup. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364/ (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Lacher, W. (2012) Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region.

McMullin, J. (2009) ‘Organised Criminal Groups and Conflicts: The Nature and Consequences of Interdependence’, Civil Wars, 11(1), pp. 75–102.

Napoleoni, L. (2003) Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks. London: Pluto Press.

Oxfam International (2015) Richest 1% will own more than all the rest by 2016. Available at: https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-01-19/richest-1-will-own-more-all-rest-2016 (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Oxford Martin School (2012) Pandemics – can we eliminate major worldwide epidemics? | videos. Available at: http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/videos/view/208 (Accessed: 4 April 2016).

Patrick, S. (2011) Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reuters (2015) Egypt’s high court overturns last conviction against Mubarak. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-mubarak-idUSKBN0KM0O620150113 (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Schirch, L. (2006) Human Rights & Conflict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding. Edited by Julie A Mertus and Jeffrey W Helsing. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Sloan, B. and Cockayne, J. (2011) ‘Terrorism, Crime, and Conflict: Exploiting the Differences Among Transnational Threats?’, Policy Brief, , pp. 1–11.

Transparency International (2008) ‘Human Rights and Corruption’, Working Paper, 05, pp. 1–6.

United Nations (2014) Global Ebola crisis response | data. Available at: http://www.un.org/ebolaresponse/data.shtml (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Wolf, M.L. (2014) ‘The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court’, Governance Studies at Brookings, July, pp. 1–15.

Woodrow Wilson Center (2016) Combatting grand corruption internationally. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GN6HDEgiSc8 (Accessed: 6 April 2016).

Small Arms Control – Jonathan Bradbeer

One of the great challenges facing the world today is the widespread availability of small arms. Deaths related to Small Arms account for large proportion of the average of 52,000 battle deaths per year, along with the average of 500,000 non combat violent deaths per year (Krause 2010 p.4).

The destruction of Small Arms often occurs during a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process at the end of conflict, a process that aims to ensure that combatants return to civilian life and do not return to armed conflict. Whilst human combatants can have alternate occupations, weapons do not, as they are designed and built to kill people. Destruction of weapons guarantees they will not kill again.

Whilst the production of Small Arms is unlikely to cease, the destruction of exisiting surplus firearms should remain a priority for the international community, for the simple reason that it is a way to reduce violence: it is more difficult to raise and arm a violent group if there are no guns available.

Vast stockpiles of weapons exist in the world today, often insecurely stored and vulnerable to theft. A large majority of these weapons are still potentially lethal, but are outmoded in terms of design or calibre, and are thus unlikely to be carried by frontline troops in modern armies. Many of these weapons are Soviet designs from the 1950’s and 1960’s, and are of extremely robust construction, meaning that once they find their way into a conflict zone, they are liable to remain in circulation for at least half a century. These weapons, typically assault rifles and sometimes smaller calibre sub-machine guns, have a high rate of fire and a very high destructive capability, but are relatively cheap, owing to their obselescence and large numbers (Collier 2009).

Many armed groups today consist of ill-trained recruits under the age of eighteen who cannot expect to be paid a wage, but instead rely on rentseeking activities from populations that live in areas that have seen a breakdown in state authority (Kaldor 2012). Africa, and the Great Lakes Region in particular, have suffered from the curse of a surplus of small arms in widespread circulation, exacerbating conflict and adding to civilian deaths. Ownership or use of an automatic weapon itself often holds appeal, as it can be used endow the owner with a sense of power and threat (Munkler 2006).

Central to any policy in reducing Small arms needs to be the tracing of the movements of small arms and tighter regulation of all small arms transfers internationally. Progress has been made at the international level in reaching agreements for the creation of linked databases to aid in the tracing of weapons, along with innovations in the marking of weapons to assist in tracing (McDonald 2015). Some progress has also been made in reducing government stockpiles in Eastern Europe, a positive development as surpluses such as these can end up being sold to third world governments.

However, the pysical destruction of weapons must remain a central focus, and it is worth considering whether this process could be streamlined and be made more efficient. On the ground, methods of disposal of weapons often remain very basic, with ritualised burnings of weapons in ceremonies, crushing of weapons with heavy vehicles and the manual destruction of weapons on lathes. This destruction process is lengthy and difficult and time consuming, as is the procedure of collecting weapons and storing them until actual destruction occurs.

One proposed solution to this could be the creation of mobile crushing units, consisting of a crushing machine that can shred steel, set on the back of a middle-weight truck, with the shredded material being conveyed on a slide to a neighbouring dump-truck type vehicle. Systems such as this could speed up one aspect of the DDR process and thus contribute to a peacebuilding process, for example meaning that once the details of a weapon are recorded, it can be destroyed immediately, without the need to collect, store and guard weapons until such time as the destruction process is begun. This does not mean that a ceremony cannot be held with select weapons at a given time, only that immediate disposal options are available. Although there are no easy ways to dispose of ammunition other than traditional demolition methods, the instantaneous destruction of small arms could already be a first step in speeding up a disarmament process.

The case for an accelerated pace in the collection and destruction of Small Arms has notably been made by events in Libya in recent years, where rebels captured huge stockpiles of weapons amassed by the Qaddafi regime and these weapons have begun to be disperesed accross Africa. These weapons have already been shown to have helped fuel the ongoing conflict in Mali (Anders 2015), and will no doubt continue to be found in Africa and beyond for years to come.

Postscript

The UN has made slow but steady progress in helping to coordinate international policies regarding Small Arms and the latest Biennial Meeting of States produced a document in the form of BMS5, which features important recommendations on stockpile management, weapons marking, record keeping as well as tracing, with the progress in the latter category being a useful step forward (McDonald 2015).

However, little discussion was devoted to  weapons disposal, and possible ways forward here needs to be discussed more widely, to see what can be done to raise awareness and thus funding for projects that involve DDR. The physical destruction of weapons component of the DDR is perhaps the easiest to address and is easy to enact, and makes a simple platform to appeal from during fundraising activities, either at the regional or international level. Until this time, it seems that insufficient press has been given to DDR activities, and weapons disposal in particular, a situation which should be remedied as soon as possible since raising awareness of DDR can also raise awareness of conflict and the political choices wich can affect conflict.

References

Anders, H. (2015) ‘Expanding Arsenal: Insurgent Arms in Northern Mali’ in Small Arms Survey 2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, P. (2009) Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. Vintage:London

Kaldor, M.(2012) New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (3^rd Ed.). Polity Press: Stanford

Krause,K.(ed.)(2010) Armed Groups and Contemporary Conflict: Challenging the Weberian State. Oxford: Routledge

McDonald, G. (2015) ‘One Meeting After Another: UN process Update’ in Small Arms Survey 2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Munkler, H.(2005) The New Wars. Polity Press:Cambridge.

Where are all the women? – Jane Townsley

Across the World there continue to be lost opportunities to build security and justice in post conflict environments by the marginalisation of women. It doesn’t make sense not to include those who can represent the needs and expectations of half the population. In the words of US Secretary of State John Kerry “no team can possibly win leaving half of the team on the bench” (Kerry, 2014 n.p.).

Women play a key role in our societies, they know what is happening within local communities and in many cases are able to influence others, including within traditional societies, where mothers have an important role to play in guiding the future path of their children. So when post conflict reform programs are being designed women need to be included in that process and in their subsequent delivery. There is evidence that when security actors take into account the differing needs of both men and women the likelihood of achieving their objectives is increased (Whiteman & O’Neill, 2012).

Focusing in particular on police reform the lack of involvement of women in certain environments particularly post conflict is shameful. According to Abbas (2016) the expansion of women’s role in law enforcement as well as the broader criminal justice system ‘Is the key necessary element to open the doors of peace and harmony around the globe. It is especially so in conflict zones and regions facing socioeconomic turbulence and instability”.

Gender responsive policing is about ensuring the needs of men and women, boys and girls are taken into account equally when delivering policing services as well as the needs of those men and women working within the police. In most cases the creation of a fully gender responsive police service within a post conflict environment requires not only increasing the number of women but also ensuring all officers are professionally trained and equipped to provide the best services to the communities they are there to protect. This does not mean that women should be restricted to non operational back office roles or that they alone should deal with women and children victims. Women officers can make a valuable contribution to operational roles, just their presence in hostile situations can defuse tensions. It is essential that male officers too have an awareness of the needs and expectations of women within society if trust and confidence is to be built for sustainable security and justice.  As stated by Bastick (2008:5) ”SSR efforts should, however not treat young men primarily as a security risk and women and girls primarily as victims”.

The status of women in law enforcement and governance is reflective of the status of women in communities which, in turn, determines a government’s ability to respond effectively to conflict (Bird, Townsley, 2015). Increasing access to justice for victims of gender based violence, something that is often prolific following conflict and disproportionately effects women and girls, is another benefit of gender responsive policing. In post-conflict societies it is far more likely that female victims would be dealt with by male officers, probably at police stations where there are no victim friendly facilities. More women officers can provide victims with the courage to take their first steps into the justice system however they need relevant training. For example, just staffing violence against women units with women officers who have had no specific training will do nothing to increase trust and confidence. Equally, professionally trained male officers can provide the necessary support and understanding required.

Where the numbers of women have been increased in policing within post-conflict environments they often are subject to discriminatory practices. In Pakistan, female officers make up less than 1% of police numbers and lack basic equipment, they are also discriminated against when it comes to nominations for training (Peters, Chughtai, 2014). In Afghanistan, where there is only 1 female officer for every 10,000 women (OXFAM, 2013) policewomen are often side lined into demeaning roles, abused and even killed (IAWP, 2014) “If you cannot safeguard women in the police, how can you possibly improve the situation for women in the community?” (IAWP, 2014: 1).

There is a disproportionate impact from conflict on women and girls when it comes to security and justice, yet they continue to be excluded from many post-conflict reform programs. Despite many advocates that the inclusion of women is essential for lasting peace, progress continues to be slow. Within security reform recruiting more women to the police alone will not solve the problem, policies and procedures need revising to create a fully inclusive police service. In order to achieve ‘real’ change, gender mainstreaming need to be replicated across the entire criminal justice system.

Postscript:

Why hasn’t effective action been taken to address the issues outlined above? A number of reasons exist but the overriding one is a lack of accountability. Who can hold governments to account? In post-conflict settings there is often at the start of reform and rebuilding processes institutions and government structures are broken if not totally collapsed. International actors including UN Peacekeepers can become involved but even then where does the true accountability lie? The only United Nations body with any ‘authority’ is the security council yet still atrocities persist across the globe, sometimes right under the noses of UN Peacekeepers such as in Rwanda and Bosnia.

The UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) is specific about the role women should play in peacekeeping and peace building yet where is the accountability when so many member states still do not have National Action Plans 16 years after 1325 was accepted? Still only 60 member states have produced their plans (Institute for Inclusive Security, 2016n.p.). The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals did not succeed by 2015, again who holds governments to account? We now have the Sustainable Development Goals #16 ‘Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’ (UN, 2016) being the most relevant to this paper. How will they be monitored and governments held to account? The UN Security Council was established following the end of WWII yet the World is a different place now and perhaps the make up of the permanent members of the security council is overdue a review something even Kofi Annan recognised whilst he was the UN Secretary General (Annan, 2013:142) as he stated, “For the Security Council to enjoy legitimacy in the twenty-first century, it needs to be not only effective but also representative” He went on to state, “The problem will not be that such countries will actively oppose the Security Council. It’s that they will ignore it” (Annan, 2013: 142).

References

Abbas, H. (2016) ‘Women Fighting for Peace: Lessons for Today’s Conflicts’ Committee on Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives, Washington D.C.: USA, 22^nd March 2016.

Annan, K. (2013) Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, New York: Penguin.

Bastick, M. (2008) Integrating Gender in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform Policy Paper 29, Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Bird, E. and Townsley, J. (2015) ‘Background’ Gender Agenda International, Sheffield: Flinch Design.

IAWP (International Association of Women Police) (2014) ‘Police Women in Afghanistan’ IAWP Campaign Briefing Paper, http://www.iawp.org/campaigns/Afghanistan/IAWPAfghanistanCampaign.pdf  (accessed 4^th April 2016).

Institute for Inclusive Security (2016) National Action Plan Resource Centre http://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org (accessed 4^th Aril 2016).

Kerry, J. (2014) ‘Closing Remarks’ at Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, London: Excel Centre, London, UK, 13^th June 2014.

OXFAM (2013) Women and the Afghan Police – Why a law enforcement agency that respects and protects females is crucial for progress, OXFAM Briefing Paper 173 http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/women-afghan-police (accessed 4th April 2016).

Peters, A. and Chughtai, H. (2014) ‘Why Pakistan Needs a Few More Good Women’ Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/29/why-pakistan-needs-a-few-more-good-women/ (accessed 4^th April 2016).

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) S/Res/1325 (2000), New York: United Nations.

United Nations (2016) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org (accessed 4^th April 2016).

Whiteman, T. and O’Neill, J. (2012) Attention to Gender Increases Security in Operations: Examples from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Washington D.C.: The Institute for Inclusive Security.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine – Mario Torre Alvarez

Considered as a core principle for human security, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, henceforward R2P, has gained momentum as a toolbox used to protect civilians from suffering mass human-induced violence. The formulation of the norm was catalyzed by two key events, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the Kosovo war in 1999. The R2P doctrine, which represents and evolution of the thinking of human rights, was embraced by the United Nations (UN) during the 2005 World Summit and endorsed by the UN General Assembly the same year during the 60th session (UN, 2005).

Throughout its three pillars, the R2P attributes the international community the obligation to ensure that the sovereign states exercises their citizen’s protection responsibilities in a timely and effective manner. The norm is aiming to fill any gap of compliance with the duty of protecting civilians by the sovereign states. The R2P doctrine reshaped the concept of sovereignty, by establishing a set of principles for the international intervention should a violation of any of the four protected core crimes be committed (ICISS, 2001).

In addition to its claimed potential corrosive effects, the R2P doctrine has received many critics over the years and continues being controversial. In many occasions, a misconception of the norm mixed with the different intervention criteria and structural problems have polarized opinions. In this context, the intervention in Libya vs the non-intervention in Syria has catalyzed an intense debate about the efficacy of the R2P doctrine, generating different levels of adherence to the norm within the international community. While the intervention in Libya demonstrated the R2P’s capacity to gather support and quickly mobilize a force, the non-intervention in Syria just highlighted the limitations of the norm (Keeler, 2011).

Indeed, the debate around the intervention in Syria was not about how to apply the humanitarian principles aim to prevent harm to civilians but about the self-interest of Russia and China using their veto power to torpedo Security Council resolutions on Syria. In this context, a significant number of academics claim that the different principles applied by the Security Council in both interventions have been led by hidden political agendas with marked positions. (Silander, 2013).

Likewise, the permanent five members continue to prioritize their geopolitical national interests over the protection of human rights. The possibility to tilt the delicate balance power in the region has overcome the atrocities committed in Syria. Like this, despite that the 5 years of conflict over 260,000 people have been killed, 13.5 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance and the conflict shows no sign of abating, the United Nations is yet struggling to respond to the challenge. Although, as noted by Petrasek, the R2P is more than a doctrine for military intervention and provide the Security Council has not taken any step to enforce other coercive measures available (Petrasek, 2013). For instance, the mass atrocities committed in Syria by President Assad could have been referred to the International Criminal Court, in addition, to explore the possibility to impose arms embargoes or no fly zones.

The facts above only stress one of the R2P’s structural problems. As witnessed in Libya, the notion of an intervention is difficult to imagine without a country’s self-interests behind, at the same time these very same hidden agendas complicate the task of preventive interventions. Although the war in Syria has reached by far the threshold of requirements established in the R2P doctrine, the mechanisms triggering the response to the violations are lost in a series of politicized decisions unable to build enough consensus to act. Perhaps, as a result to the intervention in Libya where a resolution that was based on humanitarian grounds turned out to be only a change of regime.

Generally speaking, although detractors have decline over the years, the R2P’s intent to equal the importance of the individual and the state sovereignty has not met yet the large expectations. It could be concluded that the R2P ability’s to effect a neutral intervention has been lost due to its slow and selective implementation. Nowadays, the use of the veto power is inconsistent with the core value of saving lives embedded in the R2P doctrine.

Postscript

The following reasons have been identified as key factors preventing appropriate or effective action to address the issue:

1. The hidden political agendas embedding geographical interest and different regional strategies. It is necessary to develop political commitment through a security sector reform and a much needed reform of the Security Council’s the veto system.
2. The different criteria when applying the R2P principles. The norm should be promoted outside the existing framework policies. It is paramount to develop alternatives to the military intervention such as economic sanctions, no fly zones or a deeper involvement of the International Criminal Court.
3. The lack of effective early warning system and capabilities specifically allocated have prevented an effective and efficient response.

References

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: ICISS.

Keeler, C. (2011) ‘The End of the Responsibility to Protect?’, Foreign Policy Journal, 12^th October: 11.

Petrasek, D. (2013) ‘R2P – hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis’, https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/david-petrasek/r2p-%E2%80%93-hindrance-not-help-in-syrian-crisis, (accessed 4^th April 2016).

Silander, D. (2013) ‘R2P-Principle and Practice The UNSC in Libya’, Journal of Applied Security Research, 25^th March: 13.

United Nations (2005) A/RES/60/01 2005 World Summit Outcome New York: UNGA.

A position paper highlighting the need for better monitoring and evaluation of projects in the security and justice sectors following conflict – Jo Panayiotou

The Issue

The other day I agreed to read through an evaluation report written by a colleague following some training he had facilitated in Nigeria. Headline comment was the number of individuals that had completed the training and the capabilities they consequently had. I asked him how he knew the Nigerians would incorporate their training into their work and he looked at me blankly. Browsing through other reports, I found a similar story; evaluation was focusing on output rather than result. When searching for the reason for this I found the initial training requests had been agreed based on numbers trained. With no pressure to justify the effectiveness of the training, we hadn’t bothered. Both sides were ostensibly happy, we could boast about how we were helping to develop the capacity of the Nigerian security sector and they could publicise progress by their willingness to complete internationally recognised courses. Assigning monitoring and evaluation to an afterthought appears to typify the approach taken towards both by many projects and has led to deep concern over the effectiveness of such efforts in helping to ensure projects are meeting their objectives (Anderson, Chigas and Woodrow, 2007).

The aim of monitoring and evaluation is to ascertain the relevance and achievement of objectives, impact and sustainability (Popovic, 2008). Rynn and Hiscock (2009) suggest evaluation of projects in the security and justice sectors is done badly for many reasons. Firstly due to the challenges facing projects in general such as staff finding it burdensome, weak incentives to invest in evaluation, evaluation being poorly funded and donor-driven targets distorting priorities; but there are also challenges faced specifically by security and justice projects. Both sectors are complex thus it can be hard to isolate and evaluate changes, programme objectives can be deliberately vague to allow space to develop, projects can have multiple strands and budgets with little cohesion between the various mandates, actors can have limited understanding of evaluation processes and in fragile environments it can be difficult to gather evaluation evidence. The result is that monitoring and evaluation is frequently not done, and if done, not done well.

What Needs to be Done

What needs to be done is very clear. Yes, there are many challenges involved with monitoring and evaluating projects in post-conflict areas but tools, guidelines and systems already exist for other contexts that just require a bit of adaptation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011). Rather than being a complex process that is poorly understood and therefore avoided, project managers need to ensure that individuals who are skilled in this area are employed and all other workers understand the importance of carrying out monitoring and evaluation. The best way to make this happen is ensuring monitoring and evaluation is planned for right from the inception stage of a project.

Why

As stated by Vandermoortele (2015), there are two fundamental reasons why security and justice projects need to be adequately monitored and evaluated. Firstly, so we can learn from our failures, indeed without adequate evaluation we may not even realise that we are failing. In Iraq following the 2003 intervention, several organisations ran projects to assist the state in managing its newly organised agricultural sector, seemingly successful in themselves but a lack of monitoring and evaluating impact meant that much needed help for the farmers to grow and distribute their produce was overlooked and consequently produce ended up rotting as people starved (Hassin and Isakhan, 2016). Funding is a finite resource, it is therefore essential that truly successful projects are identified so they can be scaled up or replicated and unsuccessful projects can either be restructured or closed down.

The second fundamental need for monitoring and evaluation is so we can highlight positive achievements (Vandermoortele, 2015). Documented evidence of success obtained through monitoring and evaluation can serve as a catalyst for attracting further funds and help convince recipients of the credibility of the projects. It can also highlight projects that are having similar effects in the same communities and so help refine and deconflict objectives to ensure resources across all projects are having the maximum effect in the targeted communities.

Summary

Monitoring and evaluation needs to be an integral element of all security and justice projects in post-conflict areas as it is the only way to determine if projects are successful or not. To overlook monitoring and evaluation is to risk consigning valuable resources, time and effort to projects that do not work and not learning the valuable lessons from projects that are successful.

Postscript

There are two main reasons why monitoring and evaluation are not done well. First, I believe they are poorly understood. Within my own organisation, the British Army, external evaluation cells across the training establishments were the first to be cut when it came to finding savings because their purpose and value were not understood. The same applies when it comes to the work we do abroad helping to improve the capacity of foreign armies. People are willing to release funds to send across training teams to conduct the training because there are tangible outputs – hands to be shaken, photos to be taken. It becomes extremely difficult to persuade the budget holders to follow up the training with evaluation because it is seen as taking funds away from further training.

This leads on to the second reason, an unwillingness to invest resources. As stated above, monitoring and especially evaluation in post-conflict environments can be challenging. Without having a clear idea of how they could be done effectively, it is easier to do nothing. Additionally, more often than not, projects are competing for funds and are under pressure to demonstrate value for money. Conducting effective evaluation could provide this evidence in the longer term but in the shorter term, it requires resources but may provide no tangible gain to the project. It therefore may seem to be expedient to concentrate all resources towards achieving the maximum results in the short term to procure further funds.

References

Anderson, M., Chigas, D. and Woodrow, P. (2007) Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, Paris: OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39660852.pdf, (accessed 26^th March 2016).

Hassin, A. and Isakhan, B. (2016) ‘The Failures of Neo-Liberal State Building in Iraq: Assessing Australia’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Initiatives’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 62(1): 87-99.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, (2011) Handbook on Security System Reform, Paris: OECD.

Popovic, N. (2008) ‘Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation and Gender’ in M. Bastick and K. Valasek (eds) Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR.

Rynn, S. and Hiscock, D. (2009) Evaluating for Security and Justice, London: Saferworld.

Vandemoortele, A. (2015) Learning from Failure? British and European Approaches to Security and Justice Programming, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/03/13/learning-from-failure-british-and-european-approaches-to-security-and-justice-programming/, (accessed 26^th March 2016).

Position Paper on the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa – Claude Kondor

It has become increasingly clear that as complex security challenges emerge and evolve, old ones still persist. The end of the cold war witnessed the significant proliferation of intrastate conflicts, including guerrilla warfare wherein Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) became the preferred choice of warlords to pursue their brutal aspirations (Peace Building Initiatives, 2011a). Saferworld (2011) argues that SALW are desirable because they are highly portable, deadly, easy to conceal and manipulated to kill millions of people.  Therefore, the fundamental issue that requires increased international attention is “The Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa”, which according to the Department of Criminology (2015) is the most tangible threat that undermines international peace and security. The Department of Criminology (2013) further highlights that the availability of SALW especially in post-conflict environment undermines security and the rule of law, and has adverse effects on the promotion of democracy and good governance, national reconciliation, the protection of human rights, and socio-economic development.

Frey (2004) notes that the global estimated figure of firearms is 640 million which are utilised to kill thousands of people every year. The Small Arms Survey (2003; 2004),  cited in the report of the UN Secretary-General (2008), states that over 1,000 companies in about 100 countries are involved in the manufacture of nearly 8 million small arms annually. It further estimates that at least 300,000 people are killed annually as a result of the misuse of these weapons. For instance, SALW account for between 60 and 90 percent of loss of lives during conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’ Ivoire and Mali.  Therefore it is not shocking that they have been described by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion” (Krause, 2007a:1).

It is against this backdrop that Campaign for Security Everywhere (CASE), a non-governmental organisation working in the areas of security, human rights and justice in Sierra Leone, makes its position very clear in terms of combating the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW, which is in accordance with the 1999 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related Materials (Aning, 2008).    This was well-intentioned by the Authority of Heads of State in order to achieve sustainable peace, stability and development in West Africa. However, ECOWAS has been confronted with numerous challenges, including violent conflicts, in its bid to achieve its initial objective of regional economic integration since its establishment in 1975. It is nevertheless glaring that all these conflicts have been underpinned by the proliferation and misuse of SALW.

To this end, CASE seeks to assist ECOWAS member states in combating the illicit proliferation, circulation and misuse of SALW through advocacy and sensitisation, lobbying of authorities, and also strengthen relevant institutions and civil society actors through capacity building to put an end to this complex and multidimensional phenomenon. The Peace Building Initiative (2011b) suggests tangible ways of regulating the flow and use of illicit SALW including their production and control of movement, regulating civilian possession and use of weapons, and the collection and destruction of weapons as means of getting out of this security conundrum at the national, regional and global levels. Overall, the effective and efficient coordination and collaboration among relevant actors are also quite significant in yielding the synergistic effect of combating the proliferation and misuse of SALW.

Experience has shown that security vacuum frequently follows the end of armed conflict. During this period, people trust SALW for self-protection especially in situations where the security forces are part of the conflict. In addition, some regard their weapons as means of livelihood and are therefore confident in keeping them. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2003) notes that while it is indeed acceptable that licit arms are quite essential in the maintenance of law and order, the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of such items grossly undermines stability. Consequently, the effective and efficient control of SALW is without doubt a prerequisite for sustainable peace, security and stability in any post-conflict environment.

In a nutshell, the complete eradication of SALW is a significant step in restoring justice and security in post-conflict environments, and therefore should be the utmost priority of the relevant actors including the international community. Arms do not distinguish between sexes, age, tribe, rich, poor, disabled, educated, illiterate, or religious denomination. So let us all join hands together in harmony to completely eradicate this complex reality for the sake of ourselves and posterity.

Postscript

The issue of SALW is transnational in nature which further complicates the matter especially due to cultural and legislative disparities, and lack of political will on the part of member states to end the menace (OECD, 2007). Moreover, Krause (2007b) argues that contextual differences on the issue of SALW pose a major challenge especially in post-conflict situations where the proliferation of SALW undermines peace, security and development.

Additionally, despite clear international standards that have been well articulated, members of the security forces including the police, military, intelligence forces, and other state agents, are in most cases found guilty of committing serious human rights violations using SALW. A typical example of this occurred in Guinea where pro-democracy demonstrators were shot and killed at the stadium on 28^th September 2011.   Another fundamental problem in the control of SALW is that actors involved in the sales and trafficking of SALW including terrorist groups, drug barons, and other organised criminal groups are politically and economically powerful, and have the resources to bulldoze their ways to achieve their selfish interests.

In conclusion, the issue of SALW is highly political involving numerous gladiators especially at the strategic level, and the complexities involved make it very difficult to address. However, these are likely surmountable if national accountability, transparency and control mechanisms are strengthened, coupled with strong political will at all levels of implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (IPI, 2009).

References

Aning, K. (2008) ‘From ‘voluntary’ to a ‘binding’ process: towards the securitisation of small arms’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (2):169-181.

Department of Criminology (2013) Security and Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States, Leicester: Department of Criminology, University of Leicester.

Department of Criminology (updated 2015) Conflict and Global Risks, Leicester: Department of Criminology, University of Leicester.

Frey, B. (2004) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Tools Used to Violate Human Rights’, Human Rights, Human Security, and Disarmament 3: 37-46.

IPI (2009) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity’, IPI Blue Paper No. 5, New York: IPI, available at http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/salw_epub.pdf.

Krause, K. (2007) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Towards Global Public Policy’, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, New York: IPA.

OECD (2007) OECD DAC Handbook of Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, Paris: OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2003) Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Vienna: OSCE, available at http://www.osce.org/fsc/13616.

Peace Building Initiative (2011) Small Arms and Light Weapons, Peace Building Initiative website, accessed on 11 January 2016, available at http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1732.

Saferworld (2011) Small arms and light weapons, Saferworld website, accessed on 12 January 2016, available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/what/small-arms-and-light-weapons.

UNSG (2008) ‘Small Arms’, S/2008/258, New York: UN, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW/Docs/SGReportonSmallArms2008.pdf.

Corruption – Gregory Pye

Reflecting on the course content carefully, the author has selected corruption as a topic for further discussion. Although included in course content, it is the view of the author that the subject does not have the degree of prominence necessary, to reflect the true reality and importance of corruptive practices, with which individuals working and living in post conflict situations, have to contend on a daily basis. Having lived and worked in Afghanistan for a number of years, the author is confronted by corruptive behaviours, at all levels of society, as an integral part of daily living and working experiences. Beyond the daily expectations of IED,s, Taliban attacks, suicide bombers and hashish fuelled hostility, the single foremost element which generates antagonism, frustration and personal conflict amongst international workers, is the endemic corruption, which prevails across the country. Corruption, by its very nature can be difficult to detect, as the serious Fraud Office indicates (Serious Fraud Office, 2015) the process involves two or more people entering into a secret agreement. Corruption watchdog of transparency International, indicate that corruption can involve abuse of power and resources at any level, within any sector, including businesses, public institutions and the government. (Transparency International global coalition against corruption, 2014). Corruption poses a fundamental threat by diverting public resources into private hands, away from those who should be benefiting directly in post conflict environments and continues to be a major obstacle to poverty alleviation, development and the building of security and justice. The range of activities can be considerable, encompassing as it does, accepting bribes, double dealing, under table transactions, diverting funds, manipulating officials and elections, money laundering and defrauding investors (Investopedia, 2015).

Achieving stability and security is a top priority for any intervention by the international community in an unstable post conflict country. Corruption is potentially fatal to long term stability and security and therefore countering it should be considered a pressing fundamental objective. It is difficult to read accounts about Afghanistan, without reference to multiple references to corruption. Afghanistan remains one of the worst performing countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, ranking in the bottom four in 2014, along with Sudan, North Korea and Somalia (Transparency International, 2014). Scandals range from the Kabul Bank misappropriation of 93 million dollars and the suspension of IMF support, (BBC, 2014) to articles concerning provincial and district police chiefs buying their positions for$100,000. Incredulous as these reports may seem, the author can recount numerous occasions where he has had to fight against corruption at great personal threat to his life. For example in March 2014 the Medium Tax office (MTO) , based in Kabul, received $165,000 in ‘consultants tax’, this money never reached the company tax compliance account, it was taken by an MTO employee, who paid off the National Security Directorate (NDS), who then arrested the author and warned him that this matter should be ‘left alone’! A further reality is the need to carry $1000 in a money belt in order to deal with daily confrontations by police and officials. The levels of corruption in the country are extreme. According to a recent Asia Foundation Study, in 2014, 62.4% of Afghans reported that corruption was a major problem (Asia Foundation, 2014)

In 2012, the Afghan population considered corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be one of the principal challenges facing their country, ahead of even poverty, security, external influence and government inefficiency (UNODC, 2012). Afghanistan has national anti corruption plans, laws, executive decrees and Government instruments all devoted to the fight against corruption, particular the High Office of Oversight and Anti Corruption (HOO), is mandated to co-ordinate and implement the national strategy. Inspite of the continuing efforts of this body, together with the Police, courts, Attorney General’s Office and a plethora of other related organisations, corruption continues to escalate unabated.

The causes are variable and complex. In an attempt to determine and analyse underlying processes, an insight into the historical, economy, social structure, cultural and religious practices of the Afghan Nation is elemental. Poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, weak government, drug trafficking and fear, are all instrumental factors in perpetuating an apparently intractable situation. As Lockheart, 2014, suggested, ‘The nexus of security, conflict and international development is new and a comparatively understudied area of work’ (Lockheart, 2014).

The same level of limited academic scrutiny can also be said to exist in the field of corruption research. Solutions are multifaceted, lengthy to implement and many lessons are yet to emerge from work being conducted in combating corruption in a number of post conflict countries, which may be significant in addressing the problems in Afghanistan. However, a positive approach and concerted actions, must be maintained, coupled with the encouragement of greater transparency, surveillance, detection, prosecution and eradication of corrupt norms, at all levels. The work of anti-corruption bodies requires enhanced governmental support, manpower and financial underpinning. This must be married to important associate long term strategies, such as employment creation, increase in public employee wages, reduction in poverty, eradication of drug trafficking, development of robust judicial systems and most crucially the regeneration of trust amongst the populous.

Postscript

Corruption persists in highly corrupt countries because it is not only difficult to monitor and therefore, prosecute, but also, when it is systematically pervasive, people may lack the incentives or initiative, to instigate counter measures. When considering corruption as a deep seated problem, it is perhaps important to examine two sets of dynamics which may be at interplay amongst those contemplating corruptive behaviour. Decisions to indulge in corruption are based on personal choice, coercion or group dynamics and at the same time, surveillance, monitoring, transparency and systems of prosecution, are all variables which may influence an individual’s calculations of whether to engage in corruption.

Anti-corruption activities need to be tailored to context and a thorough understanding of the dynamics of contextual factors is required. For example, greater transparency could be resisted by those in power for fear of exposure of wider pervasive practices.

Individual character, honesty and trust are vitally important, when considering suitability for key appointments. Individuals who are prepared to work within acceptable norms within culture, society, business, legal systems and government Clean up campaigns are only successful when there is a moral consensus behind them.

Measures which will undoubtedly assist in reducing corruption, should be actively engendered. Such measures include inclusiveness, increased dialogue between all stakeholders and continuing review and amendment of anti-corruption plans. Scrutiny should address roles, responsibilities, resourcing and effectiveness. Intractable problems such as corruption cannot always be eliminated completely but with commitment, dedication and resilience, it should be possible over time to contain the problem within acceptable limits.

References

BBC . (2011). Afghan row over failed bank threatens salaries. Available: http//www.bbc.co.uk/newa/world-south-east-asia-13847292). Last accessed 14th February 2015.

Lockheart, C. (2014). Building Security and Justice in Post Conflict Environmen. : A Reader.Proceedings of 2014 Security, Conflict and International Development (SCID) Symposium.. 1 (14), 4-8.

Serious Fraud Office . (2015). Bribery Corruption. Available: http://www.sfo.gov.uk>bribery & corruption. Last accessed 22nd March 2015.

Transparency International. (2014). Transparency International global coalition against corruption. 2014).. Available: http://cpi.trancparency.org/cpi2013/results/). Last accessed 14th February 2015.

UNODC. (2012). Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends. Available: http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1783/8477.2015). In. Last accessed 15th February 2015.

SCID March 2015 Intake

Forgotten Girls? Gender Sensitive Approaches for all Children Affected by Conflict – Amy Reed

The use of children in armed conflict is prohibited under international laws including the International Labour Organisation Conventions 138 and 182; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, among others. Yet globally, up to 300,000 children are being used in active armed combat (Gallagher, 2011).

In 2003 and 2004, the United Nations (UN) took a firm stance against the use of children in conflict, passing Resolution 1460 that called for an immediate halt in the use of child soldiers, and Resolution 1539 that required an action plan to monitor the use of child soldiers and recognised other abuses against children in conflict. These helped to mobilise support for child protection, contributing to an increase in protection and human rights funding from $55 million in 2002, to $212 million in 2005, to $591 million in 2015 (UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service).

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is the process through which child soldiers, and adults, relinquish their arms; troops are disbanded, and services are provided to aid reintegration into society (Anderlini and Conaway, 2004). DDR has been described as ’the key to an effective transition from war to peace’ (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996: xv).

DDR has also been accused of gender-blindness. The stage of Disarmament assumes that children have arms to relinquish, a situation that is more likely to be true for boys than girls. This has important ramifications for the rest of the process; if girls are excluded from the first stage they may be unable to access support later. This scale of this issue is tremendous; around 40% of children in armed conflict today are believed to be girls, yet they are being systematically excluded from a process designed to assist them.

The stage of Reintegration poses further challenges for many girls. In armed conflict, girls may be used for the same tasks as boys, however they are more likely to be used in domestic roles, as cooks, cleaners, or forced into underage marriage (Lamberg, 2004). Girls who have been associated with armed groups have reported rape and forced abortions, they have contracted HIV and suffer post-traumatic stress (Lamberg, 2004). Girls may therefore require a wide range of specialist services rarely available in post-conflict environments to aid their reintegration.

Reintegration often poses a further challenge for girls due to existing social norms. Girls who have been associated with armed groups frequently face discrimination, particularly if they have children by a member of an opposing group. They may be considered unmarriageable, and given the disruption to their education, they are unlikely to be able to earn a safe living (Uppard, 2007). If girls are able to access a DDR programme, doing so may prolong their association with their past and some may choose to forgo support in the interests of relative anonymity and a greater likelihood of acceptance (Uppard, 2007). In post-conflict situations, concepts of justice vary tremendously (Glasius, 2009) and children formerly associated with armed group may not be able to reintegrate due to the society’s chosen stance, irrespective of the child’s preference.

To remedy this situation, there are three required actions. Firstly, programmes must be developed to reach children in all of the different roles they take in armed conflict to complement the work already being done for children bearing arms. Secondly, there is an urgent need for a wider range of specialist services to be made available to girls leaving armed groups, and those services must be accessible.

Above all, care must be taken throughout future post-conflict activities to avoid gendered and other assumptions. In conflict, not all girls take on traditional gendered roles. Some assume positions of leadership and are reluctant to return to a society in which women are disempowered (Keairns, 2002), while many boys will have been forced into roles traditionally ascribed to women, meaning they may face additional persecution on return (Uppard, 2007). Children formerly associated with armed group may be in desperate need of support, however it should not be assumed their needs are greater than others who may have suffered the same or greater human rights violations. While good practice programmes and services can and should be identified, these should be made available on the basis of a nuanced understanding of need rather than assumptions about the situation. Only by so doing will the right models, approaches and tools be used to bring lasting peace for children and communities affected by conflict.

Postscript

This paper proposes three actions; new programmes to reach children in the different roles they take in armed conflict; the provision of a wider range of specialist services for girls leaving armed groups, and the avoidance of gendered and other assumptions in post-conflict activities. Some reasons why sufficient action has not yet been taken in these areas are detailed below.

Developing new programmes requires time and resources. The number of ongoing conflicts and urgency of need limits the resourcing available for the design, piloting and testing of new programmes. The reluctance of children to speak about their experiences in conflict also limits the data on which new programmes can be based.

Specialist services are expensive to provide and may be beyond the means of the UN and NGOs. In some situations it may be impossible, for example, if service delivery requires highly-trained local women in places where access to education is limited. Offering services to children formerly associated with armed groups but not to community members who have experienced similar abuses may exacerbate tensions between the two groups. The logistical and research challenges of identifying which services are needed in a post-conflict environment adds further constraints.

Avoiding assumptions is an area where there has been tremendous progress. While advance identification of good practice is underway, grounding this in the local context requires analysis of that context and adaptation of models before implementation. This takes time which is rarely available in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

References

Anderlini, S. and Conaway, C. (2004) ‘Disarmament demobilisation and reintegration’, Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Available online at http://botmaster.ru.caucasusbusiness.net/sites/default/files/library/TKDisarmament.pdf. Accessed 10/12/15.

Gallagher, K. (2011) ‘Towards a Gender-Inclusive Definition of Child Soldiers: the Prosecution v. Thomas Lubanga’, Eyes on the ICC, 7(1), pp. 115-136.

Glasius, M. (2009) ‘What is Global Justice and Who Decides?: Civil Society and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations’, Human Rights Quarterly, 31(2), pp. 496-520.

Keairns, Y. (2002) The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers. Geneva: Quaker United Nations Office.

Lamberg, L. (2004) ‘Reclaiming Child Soldiers’ Lost Lives’, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 292(5), pp. 553-554.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2015) Financial Tracking Service Data. Available at https://fts.unocha.org. Accessed 10/12/15.

Uppard, S. (2007) ‘Child Soldiers and Children Associated with the Fighting Forces’, Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, 19, pp. 121-127.

Colletta, N., Kostner, M. and Wiederhofer, I. (1996) ‘Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobolization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda’, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331. Washington: World Bank.

SCID March 2015 Intake

Dividing the Threat Multiplier: An Argument for Effective International Prosecution Against Grand Corruption and Kleptocratic Regimes – Maren Moon