The conflict horizon 1: Untold good news

An interesting blog post by International Alert’s President, Dan Smith, on conflict, peacebuilding and security. It would also be worth adding that the formal end of hostilities does not necessarily result in peace for many people, particularly the more marginalised and vulnerable members of society: beyond addressing the causes of conflict, there is a need – I think – to address the security needs of those who are often sidelined in formal efforts to build peace (without which the prospects of sustainable peace will be limited).

Dan Smith's avatarDan Smith's blog

Peace is the big, under-reported good news story of the 20-plus years since the Cold War ended. There are fewer wars than in the 1980s. There have been more peace agreements, and an increasing proportion of them endure for longer.

Good. Because the next 20 years will make the last 20 seem like a rehearsal for the real thing.

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INVESTING IN A POST CONFLICT CONTEXT : CASE STUDY OF COTE D’IVOIRE

Cote d’Ivoire hosted its latest Forum dedicated to investment from the 19 January to the 1st of February 2014 called “ICI2014”. This major event attracted so many potential investors (officially around 2121 including 971 foreign investors) with billions financing promises. Most of the foreign investors came from France. Chinese investors were not that mobilized around that event probably because of the Chinese new year.
The challenge for cote d’ivoire’s government after this major “show”, is to assess the impact (positive or not) of such an event on everyday’s life. How does this forum affect the lives of nationals? Does this forum efficiently contribute to economic growth to make cote d’ivoire an emerging country by 2020?
This short analysis is meant to bring critical approaches to those questions and many others. By critical I mean positive and constructive inputs to help understand the major challenges arising from a post conflict situation for a country like cote d’ivoire. Of course this insight may apply to any other country coming out of difficult crises including conflict.
I must emphasize the fact that the points revealed below reflect the weaknesses of the national policy regarding investment. It’s not just a matter of criticizing the forum that took place, it’s more than that.
An inaccurate aim
What was the aim of that forum? Officially it was to promote cote d’ivoire’s potentials as a major destination for investment. To achieve such an aim, the government invited foreign investors with a lack of accuracy and vision.
The government wanted to act like emerging countries or cities (India, china, Dubai etc.) by organizing fairs or forums dedicated to selling their potentials. Does cote d’ivoire meet the prerequisites needed to act like a future emerging country?
How can a forum meant to promote investment be held without selling efficiently the potentials of its economy? Is there a clear investment strategy in Cote d’Ivoire meant to guide potential investors?
What type of investment is expected, public or private? Indeed the lack of clarity regarding investment matters in their cross-cutting aspect weakened the whole project.
This lack of vision surrounding the event made it look like a show. The arrival of the Airbus A 380 illustrated the idea of a “show or parade”. Just another advertising opportunity for Airbus.
The effectiveness of this forum will depend on a clear-cut national investment policy with cut-crossing aims relying upon the pillars of reconstruction and stabilization in a post conflict context including, governance, security and justice. Do we meet the criteria for emergence according to those pillars?

The targets issue
Another problem that I noticed during this event is the targets. What were the targets of the forum? Big companies, small ones or both? Was it aimed at European investment more than other continents?
Indeed big companies (Bouygues, Bolloré etc.) were represented due to their sizes, investment history and as major actors who already signed contracts with the government.
On the other hand, small and medium businesses which represent the real investors in a post conflict context did not participate efficiently as potential partners and investors. Those small or medium companies where mostly expected but the expectations were not satisfied.
Besides, African businesses were under represented. Nigeria and South Africa have powerful medium companies rich enough to give jobs to Ivoirians and benefit to the national economy. Those companies were absent despite the massive presence of Burkina Faso owned companies, unfortunately not as competitive as the Nigerian or south African ones. France had 252 participants participating to the event compared to 130 for Burkina Faso.
The missing pre-conditions for investment
The government forgot that the financial investment intentions will only become reality if there is a favourable business environment.
It is only through a set of prerequisite steps that will lay the ground for future private investment and whose implementation will provide a sound basis for economic growth and employment.
In fact, the forum did not address clearly some of the major issues expected by the participants.
Unfortunately, cote d’ivoire’s business environment is not conducive to entrepreneurship and business development. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation for african Governance, Côte d’Ivoire is forty fourth out of fifty two countries. In Ecowas, the Ivoirian administration ranks fifteenth out of sixteen countries. As for Transparency International, regarding corruption, Cote d’ivoire occupies the one hundred and thirty sixth place out of one hundred and seventy seven countries involved.
Governance as an indicator for eligibility to emergence was not covered efficiently during the forum. The participants were not enlightened on the progress made since 2011 in the field of good governance and the fight against corruption. Furthermore, serious cases of corruption and violation of procurement procedure rules, have been identified for the past three years. Would any small or medium business run the risk to invest in such an environment?
The fight against insecurity was not covered neither. Despite the drop of the security index lately, times still remain insecure due to political defiance and to criminality.
The government should have emphasized the progress made for the past three years in terms of improving security in the country in order to facilitate investment. Among those improvements one can find the Security Sector Reform (SSR) national policy being implemented.

As far as investment goes, one must bear in mind that there are pre-conditions to any project to be implemented in a country coming out of a crisis. Governance and security are the major pre-conditions. A sound judicial system is another key indicator. So as to conclude, i would definately invite cote d’ivoire’s government to reconsider its national investment Policy based on real indicators, inclusive approach, potentials and opportunities.

Dr David Chuter – Conflict, Security and Development: Do We Know What We Mean?

Online Guest Lecture 2This is the second Online Guest Lecture by members of the SCID Panel of Experts. Dr David Chuter presents a lecture entitled ‘Conflict, Security and Development: Do We Know What We Mean?’.

The main theme of the lecture is that security, conflict and development can be seen as a struggle between discourses to impose a normative view, and to mark out political territory on behalf of governments, donors, international organisations and other interested actors. This leads to a high degree of confusion on the ground, as different interest groups battle to impose a view of what the particular crisis is “about”, with none of them able to dominate totally. Drawing on Gramsci and Foucault, in the first half of David’s lecture it is argued that this helps to explain the inconsistency and confusion of donor approaches, both within and between crises. The second half of the lecture focuses on the application of the concepts in practice, endeavouring to identify the main contradictions and uncertainties of donor approaches and explain where they come from.

Click on the link below to access David’s Lecture (it is large so it will take a while to download). Please submit any questions or comments within the next two weeks for David’s attention and/or discussion by other SCID Panel members, students and staff.

David Chuter Guest Lecture – presentation

First Online Guest Lecture – Conor Foley: The Legal Framework of Peace Support Operations

Online Guest Lecture Poster - Colin Foley - imageOnline Guest Lectures by members of the SCID Panel of Experts will be uploaded here every two months, on a range of subjects related to security, conflict and international development. Each lecture will be followed by a period of up to two weeks in which the Expert who delivered the lecture will respond to questions and discuss issues raised – along with other SCID Panel members, students and staff.

Conor Foley presents the first Online Guest Lecture. He discusses the legal aspects of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) by considering the relevant bodies of law in peacekeeping, principally: the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions; International Humanitarian Law (IHL); International Human Rights Law; Refugee Law; Host state law; and the State of Forces Agreements (SOPAs). Conor’s Lecture concludes by reflecting upon the issues of peacekeeper accountability and the principle of immunity, before reflecting upon the UN Human Rights Due Diligence policy.

Click on the link below to access Conor’s Lecture (it is large so it will take a while to download). Please submit any questions or comments within the next two weeks for Conor’s attention and/or discussion by other SCID Panel members, students and staff.

Peace support operations legal aspects – for SCID Blog

Thoughts on stabilisation, reconciliation and reconstruction in a Post-Conflict context

Coming from a country (Cote d’Ivoire) that is going through a stabilisation process since 2011 (post conflict), i have a few ideas to share with you on this issue.
1/ From my point of view and based on the ivorian (cote d’ivoire) case, political reconciliation and political control are two different things. Political control is a result of political reconciliation. indeed unless parties in a post conflict context, sit together and agree on a realistic roadmap for true reconciliation, then political control is possible. So reconciliation is a prerequisite to stabilisation which itself is a condition for political control.
2/ Reconstruction and stabilisation are simultaneoulsy conducted in a post conflict context in order to foster social peace, reconciliation and economic growth.
3/ Stabilisation in order to be effective must be multidimensional and inclusive. indeed stabilisation in the case of cote d’Ivoire is mainly based on a DDR program and a economic reconstruction plan. My view is that this is a limited vision of the matter.
“Justice for all” or “fair justice” is a pilar of stabilisation. More than that, democratic governance is another major condition to stabilisation.
4/ Stability relies upon justice, reconciliation, good governance, social and economic reconstruction, political will from the “winner” and SSR national policy implementation.
5/ The case of Côte d’Ivoire is a good example since we are achieving economic recovery, social reconstruction and security reforms. therefore we are failing to provide sustainable signs of a fair legal system and a true national reconciliation between people. Besides, security issues are taken into consideration but not sufficiently. For instance there is a lack of unity and confidence among the forces in charge of security and defence. Parts of the country are still facing security threats because the causes are not tackled seriously by the governement.
6/ The last point which seems important to me in a stabilisation context is mediation from exterior partners. For instance the role of France in contributing to achieve stability in Côte d’ivoire is noteworthy. More than that, the role of international actors like Human Rights Watch, the United Nations and others to monitor the evolution of major issues in post conflict countries is also noticeable.

National Security Policy (NSP) Development

NSPdevelopment – Philip Wilkinson

Attached is the document containing the conceptual diagram of National Security Policy (NSP) that was designed by Panel Member Philip Wilkinson and senior civil servants in the NSC to help busy ministers in Afghanistan and Iraq understand the comprehensive and interactive nature of NSP (copied below – please click on the image or see the document for a better quality image).

NSP Concept Philip WilkinsonThis comprehensive and interactive aspect of the concept impresses me in particular, and underscores the importance of recognising the interdependencies of security/defence, development and governance/diplomacy.

Thank you very much for sharing this, Philip, and if you are able to comment further or if others would like to comment, that would be great.

Best wishes, Eleanor

Post Conflict Stabilisation: The Means to Political Reconciliation or to gain Political Control?

Conflict cycle practitioners will recognise the word ‘Stabilisation’ and inherently feel they know what it means, but defining the term conceptually is, perhaps, not quite so easy.  

The term ‘Stabilisation’ is one of many in a new lexicon that has grown alongside post-conflict (and here I mean post-armed conflict) intervention but it is only recently that there has been much thought given to what it means and what it actually comprises.

But isn’t it obvious what Stabilisation is for? To bring stability. If one looks a bit further into how this is done, however, it reveals some rather difficult choices. Fundamentally, I would suggest, these choices are informed by the nature of the intervention. Is the intervening state doing so as a means of power projection to gain political control or is it solely a means to create mechanisms for conflict management that are not violent? Even if the latter, are the choices made consistent with local context and circumstances or are they based on an imposition of values and systems that relate to the intervening state’s interests and therefore in reality reflect the former.

What compromises should be made to effect the achievement of ‘stability’ and what is it that ‘stability’ comprises. Is it a balance of co-optive and coercive practices or a mediation between existing power elites? Is the aim to introduce systems that replicate those of the intervening state to bring routes to ‘justice’, ‘rule of law’ and so on. If so, who are the chosen ones who will implement it? And if the aim is to stop violence and introduce systems where violence free conflict management can be achieved, can this be done without political prejudice (and is that the aim)?

I am probably one of the first to post a comment, so I don’t know quite what is expected in terms of length or depth, but I will use this excuse to keep this first note brief and to the point.  

Nothing in an intervention of this type is more than fuzzy grey when on the ground and directly before taking action. I am sure also that no-one expects absolute clarity of action within the intervention itself due to the frictions of implementation. But would it not be helpful to have clarity before the event to know what Stabilisation actually means in this context?

The debate has already begun in other fora, but would it be helpful to have a stream of thoughts here too?

Malcolm Russell

Thoughts on building a national SSR strategy

SSR is Security Sector Reform. Based on the ivorian (Cote d’Ivoire) experience how can a SSR national strategy be built efficiently? What are the major steps?
1/ National ownership and understanding of the SSR process is a prerequisite
2/ Political will to conduct a real SSR is a priority
3/ A comprehensive review and overview of the national actors involved must be conducted
4/ A new national security Policy (defence and security) must be written based on the diagnosis made earlier
5/ A dedicated budget to SSR is more than necessary
6/ The SSR cross-cutting process must be inclusive and participatory
7/ The SSR actors must be entirely involved in the implementation of the national SSR strategy
8/ The SSR national strategy must be coordonated and monitored by a National Security Council chaired by a prime minister or a President for effectiveness
9/ Each SSR actor must create a SSR dedicated cell in order to implement the reforms
10/ International support for the implementation of SSR national strategy is required

Welcome to the SCID Blog

edited brochure coverWelcome to the blog for students on the MSc Security, Conflict and International Development (SCID) Course offered by the Department of Criminology, University of Leicester (UoL), its staff and members of the SCID Panel of Experts. The purpose of the blog is to share information, views and questions on issues related to security, conflict and international development. Posts can inform others of developments in the field, new publications or opportunities. The blog can also be used to post questions, comments or reflections on Course-related issues and themes, or discuss current developments in conflict prevention and recovery and related subjects.

The SCID Blog will also be used as the forum in which online guest lectures will be posted (as well as the Blackboard site and App) with a short introduction or reflective piece by the person who has delivered the lecture or presentation. Each time a lecture is posted (approximately every two months) there will follow a period of up to two weeks where students and Panel members can post questions or comments and a discussion on the subject of the lecture can proceed. Aside from supporting audio files and discussions, the benefit of hosting the online lectures on the blog is that SCID students can continue to contribute to the blog after graduation, if they wish.

Please post as much or as little as you would like: post updates, news, opinions, reflective pieces, questions, or other information that you feel other SCID students, staff or members of the Panel of Experts would be interested in. The aim of this Blog and the broader SCID Course is to provoke discussion and critical thought, ultimately in order to be better equipped to build peace and security in post-conflict environments and, more broadly, contribute to building sustainable peace in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable environments.

Dr Eleanor Gordon (SCID Course Developer and Tutor)

SCID Course link, Brochure and iTunes link: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/criminology/dlcourses/pgdlcourses/msc_security_conflict_international_development, http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/criminology/documents/SCID%20brochure.pdf and https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/scid-course/id503579966?mt=8